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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this research was to examine how the existing penal laws can be used 
to combat cyber crimes in Tanzania. It sought to examine the efficacy of the legal 
framework in combating cybercrimes in Tanzania. In the course of conducting this 
research, various methods were used. The main ones were library research and field 
work. Various individuals were interviewed as reflected in the text. The aim was to 
get data, cases, and views in relation to the subject of this study. It was observed 
that today's society has been dependent on computer and computer networks – the 
Internet. In other words, nothing so far can be done without computers. Criminals 
on the other hand have made use of the technology to perpetrate their ill motives. In 
other words, dependence upon technology has made electronic offences to increase. 
The analysis made in so far as the Penal Code of Tanzania is concerned is that it is 
not keeping pace with technology. Its provisions as discussed show that they are 
paper and physically based.  It is argued that, endeavor of law making machinery of 
the nation should be in accordance with mile compared to the fraudsters, to keep the 
crimes lowest. Hence, it should be the persistent efforts of rulers and law makers to 
ensure that governing laws of technology contains every aspect and issues of cyber 
crime and further grow in continuous and healthy manner to keep constant vigil and 
check over the related crimes.  It is for this reason that the Penal Code should be 
amended to provide for criminal activities conducted using computers and computer 
networks. The offences that should be introduced in the Penal Code are hacking, 
illegal access to computers and computer networks, fraud committed using 
computers and computer networks, money laundering and related crimes, identity 
theft, and many others in this respect. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Introduction 
Cybercrimes can be defined as offences that are committed against individuals or 
groups of individuals through electronic means and telecommunication networks 
like internet chart rooms, emails, mobile phones by way of text messages.
1
 Like any 
other crimes, computer crimes tend to pose dangers to national security and can as 
well be a threat to financial security if not well addressed.
2
 
 
Cyber crimes are growing exponentially in big cities of Tanzania where 
telecommunications via electronic means is widely used. These cities are like 
Arusha, Dar es Salaam and Mwanza where there has been evidence of occurrence of 
incidents of cyber crimes. This has presented formidable threat to our society 
particularly on young ones who may be obsessed by offences like cyber 
pornography.  
 
Recently, the governments of Tanzania have taken measures to ensure that all sim 
cards are registered for the purpose of preventing abuse of mobile phone usages. By 
doing that, it was hoped that cyber crime may decrease.  There is currently a move 
targeting cyber cafés operators who will soon be required to register all their 
customers and this is a proposal made by the police Department. The aim behind 
such move is to arrest all perpetrators of cyber crimes through mobile phones and 
the internet.  
                                                          
1
 Cited at http:/allafrica.com/stones/201206270137.html?-aa-sauce=useful-column 
2
 Ibid. 
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In Arusha, for example, one man was arrested at a certain local bar on allegation 
that he had committed a cybercrime. Prior to his arrest, there were allegations that 
the person had a barbershop and one of the services he offered was charging phones. 
He was tempted to use his clients’ money to access their M-Pesa accounts and 
transfer money to himself. It has been reported that over five hundreds (500) 
Tanzanians have been apprehended by the cybercrimes unit between 2011 and 2012 
over cyber crimes allegations.
3
  
 
The deputy Home Affairs Minister of the country Honorable Penaira Amesilima has 
also reported during the Parliament Session that after the strengthening the 
cybercrime unit in the country, the struggle has started yielding some fruits. About 
320 people have been apprehended between July and December 2011. In 2012 
about 320 people have been arrested as suspects over the crime.
4
 
 
Reports also show that cybercrimes have occasioned great loss to the financial 
sector in the country. It is said that about Tshs. 1 billion / -Euro 8,897 and USD 
551,777 have been stolen through cybercrimes, posing a big challenge to the 
government.  
Due to the high technological advancement, many cases within and outside the 
country have been referred to the courts of law. The government has realized the 
trend being on the high increase and proceeded to enact the Electronic and Postal 
Communications Act (EPOCA) of 2010 as well as the Anti money laundering Act, 
2006 to deal with cyber crimes. On top of that the government has joined efforts 
                                                          
3
 Cited at http:/allafrica.com/stories/201206270719.html.?aa-source=useful-column visited on 5
th
 
June, 2013 at 11.00am 
4
 http://dailynews.co.tz , visited on 7
th
 June, 2013. 
 
 
3 
with the Police Force, the Tanzanian Revenue Authority (TRA), Financial 
Institutions, the Media and the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority 
(TCRA) to educate the general public on what the crime is and how the same can be 
fought.
5
 
 
The relevant Ministry, through the Police Force, in ensuring that the fight to combat 
cybercrimes is enhanced has trained 250 police officers and have been distributed 
through the regions. The financial institutions have made sure that their password 
security system is tightened.  
 
It has also been reported that there are the ongoing efforts by the Government to 
ensure that there is a cyber law in the country which shall address the ever 
increasing incidents of cyber frauds and crimes.  Presently, computer emergency 
response team has been formed to respond to cyber –related crimes. In the 
meantime, the government is also considering working further on the National ICT 
Policy of 2003 to ensure that all new developments in the industry are 
accommodated. This was said by an expert of cybercrimes in Dar es Salaam when 
presenting a paper at the National Internet Governance Forum (NIGF) which is a 
multi stakeholder’s forum that discusses various issues related to governance of 
internet. This contains members from the government, the civil society, 
academicians and technical experts.
6
 
 
About 10,000 kilometers fibre optic cables of the National ICT Broadband 
                                                          
5
 Ibid. 
6
 http://dailynews.co.tz , visited on 6
th
 June, 2013 
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Backbone (NICTBB) have been laid down countrywide. Dar es Salaam alone, 90 
kilometers have been covered by the NICTBB whereas cross-border connectivity to 
other eight neighboring countries has been implemented. This places Tanzania 
among leading countries in Africa which has been covered by the optic –fibre 
cables. This being the case, the country is provided with extra required broadband 
facility. All higher learning institutions, secondary schools, primary schools and 
hospitals throughout the country, through the multi- millions state  funded project 
will obviously be connected to the national backbone as the country  embarks on 
embracing e-learning tele-medicine and e-governance.
7
 
 
Despite the high rising of cybercrimes in the country, unreliable electricity and 
limited coverage of connectivity, the national backbone has set opportunities for 
social and economic growth in the country.
8
 There is also a high increase use of e-
banking by commercial banks in the country and other computer –based 
transactions. These have fueled the high rise of cyber crimes which in actual facts 
are more complicated in investigations and prosecutions. The Director of public 
Prosecutions (DPP) Dr. Eliezer Feleshi averred that the offences involving hi-tech 
includes money laundering and financial terrorism. In essence all transactions 
nowadays are taking place online, without physically seeing the person. That being 
the case, criminals have found the internet less controlled and see it a free place 
where they are capable of committing crimes anonymously. 
 
However it has been stated that in order to combat cybercrimes, working as a team 
                                                          
7
 http://dailynews.co.tz , visited on 7
th
 June, 2013 
8
 Ibid. 
 
 
5 
is of paramount consideration.
9
For the purpose of this work much emphasis 
therefore, will be on the elimination of cyber crimes in Tanzania, the struggles, the 
law and the practice there of.  
 
The previous paragraphs sought to show that with the advent of electronic 
communications in the country, the use of e-money, e-banking, sms, MMS and 
other communications done through electronic devices like mobile phones, Ipads, 
Computer and Automated Teller Machines ( ATM) a few to mention have fuelled 
the high rise of cybercrimes. The big challenge of hi-tech is computer crimes as 
shall be discussed at length in this study. The technology has brought fundamental 
challenges and changes on the way things take place in the country. The legal 
regime is also challenged in one way or another. This work shall deal mostly on the 
role of the legal regime in eliminating cybercrimes in the country. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Despite the development economical and social brought by the use of the internet 
and e-commerce, it has emerged electric crimes or computer crimes or cyber crimes 
as famously known. There is a tremendous growth of cyber crimes in the country 
whereby consumers online are at stake. This work critically reviews the legal 
framework on cyber laws in Tanzania and sees whether the same has addressed 
cyber crimes adequately. In other words, it seeks to answer is this: Does the existing 
legal framework able to combat computer crimes and cyber fraud?  
 
1.3 Objectives of the Study 
                                                          
9
 Cited from http://allafrica.com/new/group/main/main/id/00021259.html? aa-source =  useful.com 
 
 
6 
The study aims at tracing the genesis of computer crimes in Tanzania and the 
struggles to curb or eliminate them using the legal framework. The research at hand 
shall undertake to review the role of law in combating electronic crimes in Tanzania 
to ensure that online consumers are legally protected.  The work at hand will also 
assess the efficacy of the legal framework in combating cybercrimes in Tanzania. 
The research will dissect and see whether cyber crimes in the country can well be 
eliminated just by use of legal framework or other measures on top can be 
improvised to ensure that cyber crimes issues are addressed in broader context.  
 
The work shall also assess the role of the legal profession in addressing cybercrimes 
and their challenges thereto. In the final analysis, the research shall accordingly 
advise what should be the way forward. By so doing the work shall contribute to the 
existing body of knowledge in the country on cybercrimes.  
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
This study has the following significance:- 
i. The study at hand will enrich the existing body of knowledge about 
cybercrimes in Tanzania. 
ii. The findings obtained through this study will benefit the legal fraternity and 
the public at large by letting them know what cyber crimes are, what are the 
challenges and the remedies pertinent to cyber crimes and the legal frame 
work there to.  
iii. This study reviews and assesses the legal regime on cybercrimes in the 
country and sees whether the same is adequate or not. The study also 
 
 
7 
observes and recommends what should be done based on best lessons from 
other jurisdictions with a suitable legal framework to combat cyber crimes. 
iv. This study also assesses the impact of cyber crimes on social economic 
status of the country.  
v. Last but not the least the study undertakes to address how online consumers 
should be protected against cyber crimes. What steps to be taken to ensure 
the online users are well protected?  
 
1.5 Hypothesis  
This study is built on the hypothesis that the increasing rates of incidents of cyber 
crimes in Tanzania can only be combated by an adequate and efficient legal 
framework.  
 
1.6 Literature Review  
Various writers have written on cybercrimes and this section seeks to review only a 
few which are directly connected with the problem under investigation in this study. 
After the review, the researcher will be able to show the existing gap which this 
study seeks to fill.  
 
One such author is Mwiburi, A.J.
10
. who argues that the EPOCA which was meant 
to address almost all electronic issues and communications in the country has fallen 
short of this intention. He is further of the view that cybercrimes are intermingled 
with electronic commerce like e- signature, digital signature, digital devices and e-
                                                          
10
 Mwiburi, A.J., “ Legal Implications of Developments in Information and Communication 
Technology: An Appraisal of the Electronic and Postal Communications Act, 2010 in relation to 
cybercrimes in E-Commerce in Tanzania” 
 
 
8 
contracts and that they ought to have been addressed because they are very 
important. He concludes that legal regime in Tanzania in respect of cyber crimes is 
still wanting in that EPOCA did not address all the issues important to cybercrimes, 
hence, inadequate because it leaves a big lacuna in the legal regime on cybercrimes.  
 
Another writer is Heath cote, P.M.,
11
 who discussed various issues on ICT 
generally. He discusses the role of ICT technologies in business and commercial 
transactions and developments. He further, discusses the role of ICT in 
manufacturing industries, taking care of the society and educational developments. 
On top of that, computer crimes are discussed on the purview of the United 
Kingdom Computer Misuse Act, 1990 and the Data Protection Act, 1984.
12
 He 
further advises some measures to be taken in order to protect ICT systems against 
illegal access and damages. Such measures she proposes are physical restrictions, 
encryptions and software usage. Even though Heathcoat advances useful techniques 
to ensure security to ICT devices; she falls short on what can be done in respect of 
the legal framework. 
 
Gunarto, H.,
13
 discusses ICT security on ethical perspectives and scientific efforts 
done to ensure that data are well protected. This protection should be done by 
encryptions, back ups, fine walls, physical restrictions, a few to name. He gives 
more emphasis that ethical issues or values need be adhered to, in order to ensure 
that data and information are well protected. He also discusses how important are 
the agencies mandated to watch on information security and the importance of 
                                                          
11
 Heathcote,P.M., As Level ICT,Payne-Gallawary Publishers,Ipswish,pg 2-28 
12
 ibid 
13
 Gunarto ,H., Ethical Issues in Cyberspace and IT  Society Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University 
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having new codes of ethics. He also discusses some legal issues on cybercrimes like 
jurisdiction, the criminal intent (mens rea and actus reus) and how the same aids in 
the commission of crimes. 
Sigh, Y.,
14
 discusses various issues of cyber laws such as intellectual property rights 
in cyberspace, computer software and Patent information Technology Act among 
other things. On computer security, he discusses in detail the use of digital 
signatures basing on public key and encryption using numbers. He also discusses on 
security concerns in which case he suggests that law should be used to enhance 
security. He furthermore, suggests that there should be an appointed controller on 
the use of electronic signatures and certificates.  
 
Ubena, J.
15
 discusses at length on the pace of ICT developments in Tanzania and 
argues that in the wake of convergence on various ICT technologies, Tanzania is in 
the dire need of having comprehensive electronic communications legislation.  
 
Viswanathan, A.,
16
 has also discussed on cybercrimes or computer offences among 
many issues. He elaborates what are cybercrimes and continues to mention and 
explain them being hacking, bots and BOTNETS, key loggers, website defacement, 
malware-viruses, phishing, distributed denial of services, fishing, pharming, identity 
theft, spoofing, rootkits, mobile malwares, spams, to mention a few. He discusses 
also on electronic signatures, data Protection and privacy obligations, obscenity and 
                                                          
14
 Singh,Y., ‘’Cyber Laws,’’ 5th Edn,New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co.Pvt.Ltd., 2012 
15
 Ubena, J. “Why Tanzania Needs Electronic Communication Legislation? Law keeping up with 
Technology” The Law Reform Journal, Vol 2, No.1, 2009, pg.21 
16
 Viswaanathan ,A.,Cyber Law,Indian and International Perspectives on Key Topics Including Data 
Security,E-Commerce,Cloud Computing and Cybercrimes, Lexis Nexis Butterworth 
Wandwa,Nagpur,2012 
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child pornography, liabilities of intermediaries, government interceptions, 
monitoring and decryptions and enforcement issues on institutional framework. 
Carol, J.M. has also discussed at length the issues on computer crimes and security
17
 
While carol analyses computer security premising his approach on physical and 
technological measures, the work at hand endeavors to discuss computer security on 
legal perspectives and challenges thereto. Daid, L.C
18
 argues that, as computer 
crimes become more prevalent, there is also a dire need for police personnel and 
those without computer expertise to be trained in order to have an understanding of 
various basics in computer technologies.  
 
Mambi, A.
19
 is of the view that there is a big relationship on cybercrimes, privacy 
issues and data protection, child grooming and cyber –stalking. He asserts that 
computer technology has transformed the production of child pornography into a 
very sophisticated global industry and electronic communications has made it 
possible and easy to send and receive pornography. Children are therefore targets 
and vulnerable to child sex exposed through pornography, Invasion of privacy and 
online fraud, file sharing abuse (peer 2 peer), illegal advertisements and e-gambling. 
Like the other writes, he shares the views that it is difficult to prosecute, arrest crime 
offenders of cybercrimes. The guiding questions are which country has the right to 
arrest e-crime offenders and prosecute under the cyber space? Which court will 
have jurisdiction?  
 
                                                          
17
 Carol, J.M, “Computer Security”, Butterworth’s and Company, London, 1977, pgs 81- 121 
18
 Daid, L.C, Computer crimes categories: How Technology Criminals Operate, Michigan state 
University, East Lansing Michigan 
19
 Mambi, A., shaping the information society, e-children protection, legal measures, a paper 
presented at IGF, 2
nd
 Parliamentary Forum 
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Bain Bridge, D.
20
 discusses at length the development of computer technology and 
the implications thereto. He points out that computer crimes or cybercrimes is a big 
issue in United Kingdom as per the survey done in 1999. The percentages traced 
were alarming as follows:- Pornography was 40%, hacking was 9%, viruses was 
41% and fraud was 10% 45. Nevertheless, Brainbridge discussion concentrates in 
UK and EU jurisdiction and laws. This study at hand endeavors to assess and 
discuss the cyber crimes in Tanzania, though the UK and EU experiences are very 
helpful when assessing the Tanzanian context.  
 
Another writer is Comer, M.J.,
21
 who asserts that some people discuss and suggest 
that each and everything, save for most  technical  explanation, need to be left out 
when defining computer crimes. In his views, computer fraud is all about any 
financial dishonest taking place in a computer environment.  
  
Lloyd, I. J.
22
 discusses the development of ICT by tracing it back about five 
thousand years when there was an invention of the abacus. Lloyd argues that 
computers have not been regulated seriously because were considered that, their use 
was for mathematical purposes only.  As time went on concerns on regulating 
computer started to carry legal importance when digitization started changing data 
into a commodity. Furthermore, Lloyd discusses relevant aspects of e-commerce, 
like e-contracts, e-taxation and computer crimes. Despite the fact that his analysis is 
United Kingdom based, it is very important and worthy of consideration in the study 
                                                          
20
 Brainbridge, D. , “Introduction to Computer Law, Pearson, Education London , 5th Edn, 2004 pg 1 
21
 Comer , M.J. , Corporate Fraud, Mc Graw Hill Book Company, 2
nd
 Edn, London 1985 pg 40.  
22
 Lloyd, I. J., Information Technology Law, Butterworth  3
rd
 Edn, London, 2000 pg 1 
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at hand.  
 
The above reviewed literature shows that different authors have addressed and 
discussed the issues in relation to cyber crimes on various perspectives and 
dimensions. Nevertheless, no one has addressed the ICT issues in the light of 
cybercrimes in Tanzania, assessing the law and practice thereof. This study 
endeavors to assess critically on the legal regime in Tanzania and proposes some 
solutions.  
 
1.7 Research Methodology  
1.7.1 Area of Research  
The study at hand has been mainly conducted in Dar es Salaam. The rationale 
behind this is that Dar es Salaam is a commercial city and many transactions are 
done in Dar es Salaam. Dar es Salaam is a hub as considered by many for the reason 
that all commercial communications, transactions, government Ministries 
headquarters are located in Dar es Salaam. The research preferred the City for 
purpose of convenience and availability documentation centers as well as experts 
for consultation purposes.  
 
1.7.2 Field Research  
In this category, the researcher employed the three traditionally used methods such 
as questionnaires, interviews and observation. Due to time constraints encountered 
by the researcher, she decided to unstructured oral interviews to give more flexible 
and user friendly environment to collect data, and since the study relates to different 
fields, different respondents of diverse educational background were interviewed. 
 
 
13 
These are lawyers, engineers, police officers, accountants, computer analysts, 
judicial officers and telecommunication experts.  
 
The researcher interviewed Resident magistrates at Kisutu Resident magistrate 
Court in Dar es Salaam, an advocate of the High Court of Tanzania specializing in 
ICT Laws, a graphics designer and computer programmer, Director of Legal 
services at Sumatra, IT specialist at Bomora Attorneys, Members of Parliament for 
Tandahimba who is a lawyer on ICT Laws, Head and Director of Risky 
Management at PPF,  Director of Legal services PPF, District Magistrate Karatu 
District Courtt, Karatu Arusha, the head of cyber crime Unit at the Police Force  
Head quarters, Dar es Salaam, six computer users, three from Sophy Internet café 
Mabibo Dar es Salaam and three users from Bamora Attorneys Law office.  
 
When administering questionnaires, conducting interviews with various respondents 
as already submitted above, the researcher managed to observe the magnitude of the 
problem in the country. Respondents were concerned and wanted the problem to be 
addressed. They gave the researcher full participation during the interview and 
administration of the questioners. This helped the research to get useful information.  
 
The researcher used this combined approach to ensure that data collected were 
collected from different perspectives and reflected what is happening in the field. 
This strategically employed has yielded fruits giving a balanced data collected by 
the researcher. In this respect, 70% of the planned oral interviewees were reached, 
whereas 20% of the respondents were administered with questionnaires and 
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responded in time. It is obvious that an interview was a success rather than the 
questionnaire method. All in all both were used to collect data and bring this study 
into a success.  
 
1.7.3 Library Research 
Traditional based libraries were visited by the researcher to enhance data collection. 
The rationale behind such approach was to ensure that the relevant literatures 
pertinent to this study were reviewed. The researcher visited the University of Dar 
es Salaam Library, the Open University of Tanzania Library, the school of Law 
Library and Tanganyika Library. Nevertheless, the researcher visited various online 
sources as shown in this report where she managed to trace e-books, journals, case 
books, directories , a few to name. All these were meant to enhance this study.  
 
1.8 Scope of the Study 
Collected data covered the period before the enactment of Electronic and Postal 
Communications Act, 2010, the Money Laundering Act 2009. The legislations were 
enacted meaning to address electronic communications though fell short of the 
intention. Geographically, the research has been conducted in Dar es Salaam City, 
the commercial hub where many transactions are carried out. According to the 
research problem, various respondents of different professions were consulted. The 
Research was limited between the months of June, July & August, the year 2013.  
 
1.9 Limitation of the Study  
While carrying out this study the researcher encountered a number of difficulties. 
The researcher started her study a bit late because she had family issues to sort out; 
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attending the sick   father who passed away just prior to the beginning of the 
research was not a small thing. The incident drained her energy physically and 
psychologically. The researcher had to meet all family issues, study and research, at 
the same time work out and perform well as a Magistrate. Another challenge was 
the go and come back for administering and collecting back the questionnaires. This 
made the researcher not to meet all the targeted respondents.  
 
Financial constraint was another challenge faced by the researcher. It was not easy 
to move from one place to another with a very limited self sponsored budget. 
Nevertheless, the researcher with self sacrifice and commitment, good management 
of time and well arranged financial plans, was able to make this study a success.  
 
1.10 Conclusion  
Chapter one was an introductory chapter laying down the theoretical framework of 
the study. Background to the problem, statement of the problem, study objectives, 
literature review, hypothesis, research methodologies and significance have been 
discussed at length in this Chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.0 THE NATURE OF CYBERCRIMES WITH REFERENCE TO THE 
FINANCIAL SECTOR 
2.1 Introduction 
Lloyd correctly to my view points out that criminals have taken advantage of the 
development of computer technologies to perpetrate their ill-motives and that with 
the usage of the internet in the banking sector, financial institutions have become 
constant targets of fraudsters.
23
 It is for this reason that this Chapter is intended to 
focus on cybercrimes in the financial sector. 
 
2.2 The Nature of Cybercrimes  
2.2.1 Overview 
It is true that the enormity of cyberspace is stretching the boundaries of the 
possibility of attacks worldwide in that the cybercrime is committed by the 
criminals in different jurisdiction through Cyberspace. The term cyberspace was 
first coined by the author William Gibson in his sci-fi novel Neuromancer (1984) as  
“A metaphor for describing the non-physical terrain created by computer 
systems. Online systems, for example, create a cyberspace within which 
people can communicate with one another (via e-mail), do research, or 
simply window shop. Like physical space, cyberspace contains objects (files, 
mail messages, graphics, etc.) and different modes of transportation and 
delivery. Unlike real space, though, exploring cyberspace does not require 
                                                          
23
 Lloyd, I. J., Information Technology Law, 6
th
 ed, Oxford University Press, 2011, p.210. 
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any physical movement other than pressing keys on a keyboard or moving a 
mouse.
24” 
 
Basing from the above given description it may be noted that the virtual world 
provided by cyberspace movement is borderless in nature that the “www” access 
does not require any physical movement or cross border customs checks but rather 
transitional communication with different people in different countries, whereby 
this communication or actions are made by simple click on the mouse or keyboard 
and any such communication can travel from one country to another within 
minimum time frame.
25
 Through the use of this virtual world, some people may use 
the cyberspace for better and lawful purpose while others use it for ill motive to 
commit illegal acts or to gain a certain economical advantage, this leads to the 
commission of crimes of which these days are technically referred as cybercrimes as 
explained hereunder.  
 
Cybercrime can be explained in various words such as crimes that can be committed 
with the use of a computer and the Internet. Some define it as crimes committed on 
the internet using the computer as either a tool or a targeted victim.
26
 From these 
definitions cyber crime can be looked in a narrow perspective and in a wide sense. 
Cybercrime in a narrow sense covers any illegal behavior directed by means of 
electronic operations that targets the security of a computer system and the data 
processed by them. In a broader sense (computer crime )  covers any illegal 
behavior committed by means of or in relation to computer system or network, 
                                                          
24
 Gavazos, E. A., Cyberspace and the Law, Cambridge-London, 1996, p. 1 
25
 See also Bajaaj, C. N., op.cit., p. 282. 
26
 Ibid, at p. 285 
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including such crimes as illegal possession and offering or distributing information 
by means of computer system or network.
27
 
 
Thus Cybercrime is any activity in which computers or networks are a tool, a target 
or a place of criminal activity and as hinted above it are committed through 
cyberspace.
28
 Therefore cybercrime can be simply referred as electronically 
committed crime through the use of Computer and internet and this being the case it 
is very difficult to apprehend the criminals when they are committing and it is also 
difficult to trace the perpetrator of the offence and where about because the offence 
is not a physical offence for which the perpetrator can be easily recognized and 
arrested.
29
 
 
Cyber crimes can be committed by individuals inside and outside the system. 
External individuals may have unauthorized access to the system through, for 
example hacking
30
, sniffing
31
, spoofing
32
 and denial of service
33
 attacks expose 
banks to new security risks.
34
  Open electronic delivery channels have created new 
security issues for banks with respect to confidentiality and integrity of information, 
non-repudiation of transactions, authentication of users and access control.
35
 
                                                          
27
 Ibid. 
28
 See Prasana, A., “Cybercrime: Law and Practice” accessed at 
http://www.img.kerala.gov.in/docs/downloads/cyber%20crimes.pdf 
29
 Bajaa, K.. K. & Debjani, N., op.cit., at p. 282. 
30
 Hacking refers to the practice of breaking into a computer without authorization, for malicious 
reasons, just to prove it can be done, or for other personal reasons. 
31
 Sniffing involves the use of software program that is illicitly inserted somewhere on a network to 
capture (sniff) user passwords as they pass through the system. 
32
 Spoofing refers to an attempt to gain access to a system by posing as an authorized user. 
33
 A denial of service attack represents an attempt to overwhelm a server with requests so that it 
cannot respond to legitimate traffic.  
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Ibid. 
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Frauds and theft is said to be a breach to the security system of financial 
institutions’ payment systems, which may have adverse affects on individual 
accounts or threaten institutions or networks.
36
 The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
underscores the fact that industry statistics show payment fraud continually 
evolving, which is a likely reason it will never disappear and that institutions prefer 
to incur losses associated with fraud rather than paying the price of preventive 
measures.
37
  
 
Fraud is not new to banks. Consumers transacting banking business in electronic 
form are likely to face problems that their counterparts transacting paper-based 
banking business face.
38
 The difference is that e-crimes are committed in the digital 
environment. However, it is argued that theft is theft regardless of whether it is 
digital theft or traditional theft.
39
 The Modus operandi has changed with the digital 
capabilities enhancing the speed, reach, and magnitude with which these crimes are 
executed.
40
  
 
There is no need for thieves now days to use a gun and physical presence in a 
branch to rob banks. It is disgusting to learn that, fraudsters use the same 
technologies that enable electronic payment innovations to perpetrate criminal 
                                                          
36
 Gibbons, J. H., “Selected Electronic Funds Transfer Issues: Privacy, Security, and Equity”, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. 
37
 See an Article “Fight against payments fraud: The target is moving, but no everybody takes aim’ 
accessed at http://portalsandrais.frbatlanta.org/online-banking-fraud/  
38
 See also Loudon, K.C. & Traver, C.G., op.cit., at p. 262. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Kondabagil, J., op.cit., at p. 93 
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intents, like identity theft and payments fraud.
41
 They only need access to a 
networked computer giving rise to risks of transacting with unauthorized or 
incorrectly identified individuals in an electronic banking environment, the apparent 
consequences being financial losses to both customers and banks through fraud.
42
 
 
There are numerous ways in which criminals have exploited the vulnerabilities in 
the open networked environment of e-banking and committed frauds.
43
 Even 
systems closed networks have occasionally been targets of criminal attacks. From 
this analysis, two major categories of frauds can be made. These are card-based 
fraud and network-based fraud.
44
 The section below attempts to give a detailed 
discussion on these ways in which fraud can be committed. Where possible, 
statistics to support the discussion will be given. It should however be pointed that, 
a discussion on types frauds can only a discussion towards a very controversial issue 
– how are issues related to liability for losses handled. 
 
2.2.2 Card-Based Fraud 
Igor Pipan
45
 points out that the vast growth of the payment card industry (PCI) in 
the last 50 years has placed the industry in the centre of attention, not only because 
of this growth, but also because of the increase of fraudulent transactions.
46
 Despite 
these efforts, it is on record that in UK alone cash machine fraud losses totaled £ 
                                                          
 
42
 Ibid.. 
43
 Ibid.  
44
 It is always safe to classify frauds in e-banking due to the fact that as technology advances, 
criminals also forge new ways of committing fraud. 
45
 Pipan, I, The Role of IT/IS in Combating Fraud in the Payment Card Industry, accessed at 
www.arraydev.com/commerce/jibc/ . 
46
 Ibid. 
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36.7 in 2009.
47
 The European Commission reports estimated credit card fraud in 
European Union is between €500 en €1000 million.48 
 
The UK Payment Association recognizes five types of card-based fraud:
 49
 firstly, 
lost/stolen credit or debit card where the card is lost or stolen and then used by an 
unauthorized individual. Secondly, mail non receipt where the card or cards are 
being intercepted while being sent to the cardholders by post. Thirdly, counterfeit 
which is the type of fraud same as skimming, where the card information is copied 
from the magnetic stripe. Fraudsters often skim cards by using a device that is fitted 
to a cash machine or a PIN pad. This data is then transferred onto a fake magnetic 
stripe card and used in countries that have not yet rolled out chip and PIN.
50
 
Fourthly, card not present where the account information from the card is used to 
make unauthorized purchases over the telephone or the internet, and lastly, card ID 
theft where the account information is stolen by unauthorized individuals to make 
fraudulent purchases and can take many different forms.  
 
Fraudsters can as well access the card systems and copy information that they may 
use to access customers’ funds. In 2009, 60 percent of identities exposed were 
compromised by hacking attacks, which are another form of targeted attack.
51
 The 
                                                          
47
 The source of this information is 
http://www.link.co.uk/Press/NewsReleases/Pages/Fraud_Prevention_Guide.aspx  
48
 APACS, 2008; FPEG, 2009; European Commission, 2008. JIBC December 2009, Vol. 14, No. 3 
49
 The source of this information is 
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ud 
50
 Ibid.  
51
 Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report: Trends for 2009 Volume XV, Published April 
2010accessed on http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-
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majority of these were the result of a successful hacking attack on a single credit 
card payment processor. The hackers gained access to the company’s payment 
processing network using an SQL-injection attack. The attackers then installed 
malicious code designed to gather sensitive information from the network, which 
allowed them to easily access the network at their convenience. The attacks resulted 
in the theft of approximately 130 million credit card numbers. An investigation was 
undertaken when the company began receiving reports of fraudulent activity on 
credit cards that the company itself had processed. The attackers were eventually 
tracked down and charged by federal authorities.
52
 
 
2.2.3 Network-Based Fraud  
It was pointed out earlier in this Chapter that, existing banks with physical offices, 
ordinarily termed as ‘brick-and-mortar banks, are establishing websites and offering 
internet banking to their customers in addition to their traditional delivery channels. 
There are also those banks which offer ‘internet only’ banking services with the data 
centre or some other location serving as the legal address. These banks allow 
customers with the ability to make deposits and withdrawals via ATMs or other 
remote delivery channels owned by other institutions.  
 
Customers may also make use of their debit and credit cards when paying goods and 
services in face to face, internet or telephone. For law-abiding citizens, the internet 
holds the promise of a huge, convenient, global marketplace, al at a bargain price. 
For criminals, the internet has created entirely – and lucrative-ways to seal from the 
                                                          
52
 Ibid 
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more than 1 billion consumers in the world over the internet.
53
 According to Singh,
 
54
steep rise in online banking fraud has undermined its success as few bank 
customers want to return to boring bank queues for secure transactions.  
 
Internet banking fraud is fraud or theft committed using online technology to 
illegally remove money from, or transfer it to, a different bank account.
 55
  The risk 
on the internet being used in effecting payments lies on its nature.
56
 Loudon & 
Traver
57
 underscores the fact that the internet was never designed to be a global 
marketplace with a billion users, and lacks many basic security features found in 
older networks such the telephone systems. It is open and vulnerable by design.
58
 
The communication path is very complex and it may include passing through 
several public servers, lines or devices between the customers personal computers 
and the bank’s internal networks.59 The Reserve bank of India’s Report on Internet 
Banking (2001) outlined some distinctive features of the Internet.  
 
First, it removes the traditional geographical barriers as it could reach out to 
customers of different countries/legal jurisdictions. This has raised the question of 
jurisdiction of law and / or supervisory system to which such transactions should be 
                                                          
53
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th
 Edn, 2008, 
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54
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55
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subject.
60
 Second, it has added a new dimension to different kinds of risks 
traditionally  associated with banking, heightening some of them and throwing new 
risk control challenges. Third, security of banking transactions, validity of electronic 
contract, customers’ privacy, etc., which have been traditional banking concerns 
have assumed different dimensions given that internet is a public domain, not 
subject to control by any single authority or group of users.
61
 Fourth, it poses a 
strategic risk of loss of business to those banks who do not respond in time, to this 
new technology, being the efficient and cost effective delivery mechanism of 
banking services. Lastly, a new form of competition has emerged both from the 
existing players and new players in the market who are not strictly banks as several 
policy decisions have also been made.
62
  
 
As will be shown below, threats in security of electronic payment systems at the 
global level are alarming, despite efforts employed by banks to minimize security 
breaches. For example, in 1995, $10 million computer fraud against Citibank was 
the first successful penetration by a hacker into the system which transferred 
trillions of dollars a day around the world. Of the $10 million dollars illegally 
transferred, $400,000 was not found.
63
 
 
Hi-tech fraudsters have urbanized a new way of tricking on line banking customers. 
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One such most well known and fast growing technique is phishing.
64
 It is derived 
from fishing. Phishing (also called brand spoofing) is a term used for a short of 
fraud where phishers send out spoof email to a random database to fool the recipient 
in to divulging personal information like credit cards details, usernames and 
passwords, that can be used for identity theft.
65
 Phishing is one of the most well 
known and fastest growing scams on the Internet today.
66
  
 
According to Singh,
67
 the typical phishing scam involves an e-mail that appears as 
though it came from a reputable and known service institutions or company. The e-
mail appears to be legitimate and the actual one. The message generally indicates 
that, due to problems in the institution (bank in this case) such a database updates, 
problem occurred in server, security/identity theft concerns, the recipient is required 
to update personal data such as passwords, bank account information, driver's 
license numbers, social security numbers, Personal Identification Numbers (PIN), 
and so forth. The e-mails include warning to the users that failure to immediately 
provide the updated information will result in suspension or termination of the 
account.
68
  
 
Latest in phishing is application of Trojan horse program. Trojan horse" program 
insinuates itself into a user's computer via an email and directs the user of the 
system to website which is exactly similar to financial institution web site. Crooks 
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pick up passwords and account numbers as soon as customer logon to these sites.
69
 
In 2009, the financial sector remained the sector most heavily targeted by phishing 
attacks, accounting for 74 percent of the brands used in phishing campaigns. 
Analysis of the data for phishing websites in 2009 indicates that the financial 
services sector also accounted for 78 percent of that total, which was slightly higher 
than 2008, when the volume of phishing websites for financial services was 76 
percent.
70
 Again, in 2009, the top two brands phished belonged to the largest U.S.-
based multinational banks. In 2008, these brands ranked 17th and seventh in 2008, 
respectively. There was nearly a sevenfold increase in phishing URLs that targeted 
the top-phished brand in 2009 over the previous reporting period, while the second-
ranked brand had almost a threefold increase. This indicates that phishers are 
narrowing their focus. Rather than targeting a wider range of smaller financial 
institutions, they are specifically targeting the largest banks that are more likely to 
have a higher number of customers banking online.
71
 
 
In the recent past, according to the UK payments association Apacs,
72
 the huge rise 
in online banking fraud coincides with an upsurge in the number of phishing scams 
being run on the web and demonstrates the importance of educating bank customers 
about this type of crime. The similar concern is raised by Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), UK regulator. FSA recorded 8.000% increase in online banking 
frauds and identified phishing as major instrument. With the growth of phishing 
customers are realizing that online transactions in particular e-commerce 
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transactions are not safe.
73
  Globally, about 30,000 phishing attacks are reported 
each month, of which over 80% are directed at financial institutions.
74
 Phishing 
attackers have targeted at financial entities such as Citibank, Wells Fargo, Halifax 
Bank, eBay, and Yahoo as reported by Secure Science Corporation (2003).
75
 
 
 In the UK alone, the number of recorded phishing incidents was 312 and 5059 
between January to June, 2005 and January to June 2006 and it was among top 10 
phishing site hosting countries from Jan 2005 to Jan 2007.
76
 The amount of cash 
stolen in the first half of 2006 was £23.2m, the committee was told, and was likely 
to be £22.5m in the second half of the year.
77
  Singh points out  US as leaders of top 
10 phishing sites hosting countries and also experienced large number of phishing 
attacks.
78
 At least 1.8 million consumers had been tricked into divulging personal 
information in phishing attacks, most within the past recent years.
79
 The average 
loss per phishing attack was $1,244 in 2006, up from $256 in 2005.
80
 
 
In an interesting case in the United States, Joe Lopez,
81
 a Miami businessman who 
regularly conducted business over the internet, sued Bank of America at the Miami 
Circuit Court for negligence and breach of contract for failing to provide protection 
for online banking risks that the bank was aware of. On 6th. April 2004, his 
computer system was hacked into and US$90,348.65 was wired from his account at 
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Bank of America Direct, its online portal, by Latvian cyber criminals, to Parex 
Bank, a bank in Riga, Latvia without his approval. About US$20,000 of the money 
was withdrawn before the account was frozen by the Latvian bank. A subsequent 
Secret Service investigation requested by the bank detected the presence of the 
'coreflood keylogging Trojan’ on his computer.  
 
Lopez claimed that Bank of America had knowledge of the Trojan horse virus 
known for infiltrating and compromising security systems and enabling 
unauthorized access to infected computers, and therefore the bank had a 
responsibility to inform its customers of the virus. Further the bank should have 
been alerted when the transfer of such a large sum to Latvia was initiated. Latvia, 
along with Russia, Eastern Europe, and the other Baltic states is known for having a 
high level of cyber-criminal activity and thus a large monetary transfer to that part 
of the world should have been questioned by the bank. 
 
 To make matters worse the bank failed to act upon being notified within minutes of 
the unauthorized transaction and refused to assist in liasing with the Latvian bank to 
freeze the monies or release the balance to Lopez. It was only in July 2004, that the 
bank sent a letter to its users alerting them to a new "dual administration" feature 
requiring the approval of at least two individuals to execute a funds transfer. The 
letter also recommended that clients install antivirus software. Bank of America 
denied liability for the loss since its systems were not hacked into and all 
appropriate measures were taken to complete the transfer. 
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2.2.4 Banks’ Employees Fraud  
Employees of the institution are frequently the source of electronic banking crime.
 82
  
They are likely to have access to the systems and often can mask criminal actions 
behind legitimate activities. They may hide unauthorized procedures within 
programs (the “Trojan horse” strategy) by building in instructions to abort or divert 
authorized transactions, and then remove this procedure from the computer’s 
memory bank
83
. Unauthorized copying of either programs or data, such as account 
numbers and personal identification numbers (PINs), usually cannot be detected or 
traced.
84
 It is for this reason that many incidents of e-crimes are difficult to detected 
when they are committed by insiders, who have a good understanding of the 
systems and controls and are thus able to exploit the loopholes without leaving 
trace.
85
 
 
Talwar
86
 recounted a reported incident of an IT expert who could penetrate the 
multilayer password system governing the fund transfer facility of the bank, which 
was allowed to be self-operated by its corporate customers. He could successfully 
effect wire transfer of millions of dollars from a corporate account to his own / 
wife's account across continent to a destination in Europe. Though the corporate 
treasury manager of the customer was watching the fund transfer stolen and shifted 
before his very eyes, he was helpless in the context of such operation happening in 
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few seconds. While the cyber reach was possible in seconds, the efforts of law 
enforcement took time to cross the continental legal and criminal enactment barriers 
to overcome before they could ultimately nab the above criminal.
87
 
In Nigeria, 600 Euros Electronic Funds Transfer fraud perpetrated through a bank in 
Benin, Edo State. The amount was sent by an Irish businessman, Kevin Fuller, to 
his Nigerian partner through Western Union Money Transfer at 5.28pm Nigerian 
time on 3rd November 2008 from Dublin Ireland. The money was collected by a yet 
to be identified person at exactly 6.22pm Nigerian time on the same day. The 
inward transfer and outward payment took place after 4pm when banks had closed 
their doors to outside customers. 
 
2.2.5 Money Laundering Using Electronic Banking 
The offence of money laundering is now being committed using computers and 
computer networks, the internet inclusive. The imminent danger with the use of the 
internet is that transactions become instantaneous, untraceable and may easily be 
anonymous, leaving no audit trail.
88
 As shown below, the use of computer 
technologies to perpetrate the offence of money laundering is currently not a new 
thing in Tanzania.  
 
2.3 Incidents of Frauds and Unauthorized Transfer in E-Banking in Tanzania 
As pointed out earlier in this study, clear manifestations of breach of security in e-
banking include frauds, identity theft and unauthorized access to customers’ 
accounts leading to unauthorized transfers of funds. A few incidents of fraud, 
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unauthorized transactions and identity theft that occurred in Tanzania show that 
Tanzania is not an island. The process of stealing money or property by using 
computer is called computer fraud which can be done in two ways.
89
 The first is by 
using a forged bank card, and the second is by giving instructions to the computer to 
transfer funds from one bank account to another.
90
  
 
The reasons for the increase of frauds in the banking sector include presence of 
unfaithful staff, lack of effective internal controls as well as willingness to share 
negative information among financial institutions and with law enforcers.
91
 A few 
incidents below show that consumers transacting banking business in electronic 
environments face problems related to fraud leading to loss of their money.  
 
There are a few incidents on unauthorized access to customers’ accounts which 
were referred to courts of law. The first one involved one employee of the CRDB 
Bank together with another person from Mikocheni, Dar es Salaam. They were 
charged at the Kisutu Resident Magistrate’s Court on 16th October, 200792 for 
allegedly committing the offence of stealing Tanzanian shillings 62, 000, 000/= 
through ATM machines using a debit card, branded “Tembo Card”. At the time of 
writing this study, the case was still pending at the mentioned court. 
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The second incident involved two Bulgarian nationals, Nedco Lazarov Stanchev and 
Stela Peteva Nedelcheva who were charged at the Kisutu Resident Magistrate’s 
Court on 27
th 
July, 2009 for forging an ATM card
 93
 contrary to sections 333, 335 
(a) and 337 of the Penal Code
94
 and stealing contrary to section 265 of the same 
law.
95
 The accused persons were arrested following complaints by bank account 
holders that they were losing their savings in unauthorized ATM withdrawals.
96
 A 
detective posing as a cleaner found a special device that the perpetrators had used to 
discreetly record people's Personal Identification Numbers (PIN).
97
  Before they 
were arrested, the accused persons had already stolen Tshs. 14, 500, 000/= between 
10
th
 and 17
th
 July, 2009.
98
 At the time of preparation of the first draft of this study, 
this case was also pending at Kisutu Resident’s Magistrates Court. 
 
The third incident involved three accused persons, namely Akinlade Steve 
Ayorinde, Victor Mwombeki Rugarabawa and Alibina Anthoby Mushi.
99
 In this 
case, the accused persons were charged with five counts of conspiracy to commit an 
offence of forgery contrary to section  384 of the Penal Code, Cap 16 [R.E. 2002] 
and four counts of forgery contrary to sections 333, 335(a) and 337 of the same law.  
 
According to particulars of the offences, the accused persons forged four credit 
cards in Arusha and Dar es Salaam. The first visa card had numbers 
                                                          
93
 See the Charge Sheet filed by the Republic in Criminal Case No. 147 2009 accessed by the 
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 See Criminal Case No. 518 of 2010 pending before the Ilala District Court in Dar es Salaam. 
Records in respect of this case were accessed by the Researcher during the Field Survey at the Ilala 
District Court, Dar es Salaam on 8
th
 July, 2013. 
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4434010000179843 which purported to have been issued by Cuscal Limited of New 
South Wales, Australia. The second visa card which purported to have been issued 
by Grow Financial Federal Credit Union of Tampa, Florida had numbers 
4762070003614805. The third visa card had numbers 4559515000815914, which 
was purportedly issued by Chase Bank USA National Association of 2500 West 
Field, USA. The last visa card which purported to have been issued by the same 
Chase Bank USA National Association had numbers 4559592600486718.  
 
The fourth occurred in 2009 when three businessmen and five officials of Barclays 
Bank were charged at the Kisutu Resident Magistrate’s Court with conspiracy and 
fraudulently obtaining USD 1,081,263 (Tshs 1.43 billion), the property of Barclays 
Bank.
 100
  It was alleged that the accused forged two Society Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) messages purporting to transfer funds to 
Kigamboni Oil COM Limited.
101
 At the time of writing this study, the case was still 
pending at the above mentioned Court. 
 
As pointed earlier in this chapter, mobile banking is an innovation in Tanzania. 
Despite being a new distribution channel in Tanzania, fraudsters are increasingly 
using it to steal money from customers’ accounts.102 This problem is mostly 
common in NMB Mobile Banking.
103
  Many customers using NMB Mobile have 
complained against unauthorized transfer of funds without their consent or 
                                                          
100
 See Daily News of 6
th 
March, 2009, ISSN 0856-3812. 
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knowledge.
104
 The main reasons are negligence of customers in not keeping safe 
their cards and Codes and ignorance in using the ATMs to either withdraw or 
transfer money.
105
  
A customer, for example, who has little or no knowledge in using an ATM may 
request another customer to assist. In the course of assisting him or her, he/she 
records the PIN as well as the number of the account and later uses these records to 
register in NMB Mobile as a genuine customer. He/she then transfers money from 
the customer’s account to his own or some other person’s account, after which he 
could now either transfer the money or withdraw using an ATM card.
106
  
 
The customer may at a later stage discover that there is an amount of money or all 
the money in his/her account missing. In case he/she reports to the bank about the 
loss, the bank would at best assist him to trace the mobile phone number used to 
transfer the money. The customer would be lucky if the thief did not throw away or 
destroy the line he/she used. At times it proves very difficult to trace the person. In 
case efforts to trace the thief become successful, investigations leading to the thief 
being charged in Court would be made.
107
 There are two incidents of theft using 
mobile phones that have been referred to a court of law. It should be pointed out that 
these are not the only incidents. There may be many others but the following two 
are used to justify the above contention. 
 
An incident which occurred in Dar es Salaam in December 2010 is relevant to this 
                                                          
104
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study
108
 In this incident, five University of Dar es Salaam students appeared before 
the Resident Magistrate’s Court at Kisutu for allegedly stealing Tshs. 20,280,000 
belonging to various customers using mobile phones.
109
 Before the court, the 
prosecution alleged that the accused persons stole the amount of money belonging 
to two customers whose accounts were kept at NMB bank, Rufiji branch in the 
Coast Region, Tanzania. During the time of writing this study, the case was still 
pending at the court. Despite being newly introduced, the internet has also started 
being a target for crime. The CRDB internet banking system was recently used by 
one person to have unauthorized access to one customer’s account maintained by 
the bank.
110
 The customer was somehow negligent in keeping safe his user ID and 
the Password.  
 
The criminal managed to transfer about 46, 000 USD to an account belonging to 
another customer of the bank, who, by the time he was arrested, had withdrawn 
about 40,000 USD.  The case against him is pending at the Kisutu Resident 
Magistrate’s Court. The criminal who transferred the money without authority of 
the owner was later arrested and after being questioned, admitted committing the 
crime. 
 
Computers and computer networks including the internet are now used to commit 
the offence of money laundering.
111
 The imminent danger with the use of the 
internet is that transactions become instantaneous, untraceable and may easily be 
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36 
anonymous, leaving no audit trail.
112
 The use of computer technologies to perpetrate 
the offence of money laundering is currently not a new thing in Tanzania. Several 
incidents that have been reported over the media and some which have landed to 
courts of law is evidence to this fact. 
In July 2010, a number of cases on money laundering were filed in the Kisutu 
Resident Magistrates’ Court in Dar es Salaam. A glance at these cases shows that 
the computer or computer networks facilitated commission of the offence to a large 
extent. The first case involved the Republic v. Justice Lumima Katiti and 4 
others.
113
 The accused persons in this case were charged with the offence of money 
laundering contrary to sections 3, 12(e) and 13(a) of the Anti-Money Laundering 
Act, Act No. 12 of 2006. It is detailed in the particulars of the offence that the 
accused persons transferred millions of money from several account numbers to 
other account numbers in diverse occasions. 
 
 Particulars of the ninth count in the charge sheet in the above case show that the 
accused persons transferred money from account No. 07410300033 of the National 
Bank of Commerce maintained by Excel Media amounting to Tanzanian Shillings 
nine hundred sixty million, one hundred forty eight thousand, two hundred ninety 
shillings and fifteen cents (Tshs. 960, 148, 290.15) to account Nos. 07413000112 of 
the National Bank of Commerce maintained by Express Booking Enterprises; 
074103000276 of the National Bank of Commerce maintained by TAC Traders 
Limited and 074103000100 of the National Bank of Commerce maintained by 
Daima Pharmaceuticals while they knew or ought to have known that the money 
                                                          
112
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was the proceeds of a predicate offence, namely theft, for the purpose of concealing 
the origin of that money or evading legal consequences of their actions.  
 
The tenth count in the charge sheet showed that the accused persons transferred 
Tshs. 1, 426, 450, 680 to account number 074103000276 of the Nairobi Bank of 
Commerce maintained by TAC Traders Limited. The eleventh count showed that 
the accused persons transferred 1,415,418,801 to account numbers 07403000112 of 
the National Bank of Commerce maintained by Express Booking Enterprises, 
074103000276 of the National Bank of Commerce maintained by TAC Traders 
Limited and 074103000100 of the National Bank of Commerce maintained by 
Daima Pharmaceuticals. 
 
The money, the subject of the offence of money laundering as shown above 
originated from a theft that was earlier committed by one of the accused persons in 
the above case, namely, Justice Lemima Katiti, who was an accountant of the 
Tanzania Revenue Authority. The amount stolen as indicated in the charge sheet in 
Criminal Case No. 149 of 2010 was Tanzania Shillings one billion, four hundred 
twenty six million, four hundred fifty thousand, six hundred eighty and five cents 
(Tshs. 1,426,450,680.05). An interview with the presiding magistrate, revealed that 
the accused person used the electronic transfer systems to move the money from one 
account to others for the purpose of concealing its source. 
 
Another case of the same nature that was referred to Kisutu Resident Magistrates’ 
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Court in Dar es Salaam was the Republic v. Faraji Augustino Chambo.
114
 In this 
case, Faraji Augustino Chambo was accused of two offences. The first one was 
obtaining money by false pretence contrary to sections 302 of the Penal Code, and 
the second was money laundering contrary to sections 3, 12(b) and 13(a) of the 
Anti-Money Laundering Act.
115
  In the first offence, the particulars stated that the 
accused obtained by false pretence Tshs. 671,212,379.92 on the 30
th
 day of June, 
2008 in Dar es Salaam. The accused purported to show that the money was genuine 
payment from Tanzania Telecommunications Company Ltd to Trade Union 
Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA) for seminar activities.  
 
After obtaining this amount of money, the accused moved the same from one 
account to another for the purpose of concealing its source. The accused had first 
transferred the amount from Account No. 011103001244 maintained by Tanzania 
Telecommunications Company Ltd at National Bank of Commerce, Corporate 
Branch to Account Number 01J1007892600 maintained by Trade Union Congress 
of Tanzania (TUCTA) and then transferred the same amount of money to Account 
Numbers 01J10028402800 maintained by Millennium Promotions Ltd at CRDB 
Bank, 018101006845 maintained by TUCTA at National Bank of Commerce, 
Mnazi Mmoja branch and 04710300144 maintained by Romos Technology Ltd at 
National Bank of Commerce. Immediately after transferring the above amount of 
money, the accused withdrew it from the mentioned accounts.
116
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Another similar incidence took place in Arusha. In this incident, three accused 
persons, namely James Elineema,
117
 Elineema James of Kitunda Engineering Co. 
Ltd., and Said Kakiva were charged before the Resident Magistrate’s Court at 
Arusha, with conspiracy, forgery and stealing contrary to sections 384, 333, 335(a) 
and 337 and 265 of Penal Code.
 118
  The particulars of the offence of conspiracy 
indicated that the three accused persons did, on or about 5
th
 day of January, 2009 at 
CRDB Bank Arusha Branch in Arusha, jointly and together conspire to commit the 
offences of forgery and stealing.
119
  
 
The particulars of the second offence show that the three accused persons on the 
above mentioned date and place jointly and together forged an electronic bank 
transfer of CRDB purporting to show that the said Bank Transfer was genuine and 
valid while in fact it was not true. The particulars of the third offence detailed that 
the said accused persons did, at the above mentioned bank premises steal Tanzanian 
shillings amounting to 60,000,000/= via cheque number 675586, the property of 
CRDB Bank.
120
 
 
Another incident occurred at NMB Bank in Manyara Region.
121
 In this incident, six 
persons managed to unlawfully transfer Tshs.171, 000, 000/= Tanzanian Shillings 
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from a customer’s account which was maintained in the same bank to their 
dubiously opened accounts in Chake Chake Pemba. Immediately, the same sums of 
money were transferred to another dubiously opened account held at NMB 
Madaraka Branch in Tanga. The criminals had purported to have been operators of 
an NGO called Ranifa Economic and Development Group and all documents used 
for registration of this NGO and later the opening of the mentioned account in 
Tanga were later found to have been forged.
122
  
 
The criminals managed to withdraw Tshs. 58, 550, 000/= before the scam was 
detected. The only person who was arrested was one Khamisi Ally Salum, who sold 
building materials to those criminals. He was charged at Tanga Resident 
Magistrate’s Court in connection with this offence and was later acquitted for lack 
of prosecution. Following this acquittal, the Office of the Attorney General in Tanga 
returned the file to the Regional Crimes Officer for further investigation, which may 
result in the arrest of the real culprits.
123
 
 
The accused, namely Hassani Faraji @ Kimaro
124
 was in the first instance charged 
before the Resident Magistrates’ Court in Tanga with 274 counts of fraudulent false 
accounting contrary to section 317(b) of the Penal Code and 78 counts of stealing 
by servant contrary to sections 258 and 271 of the same Penal Code.
125
 During the 
hearing, the prosecution alleged that the accused person with intent to defraud made 
false entries into the computer records in order to benefit himself from the 
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difference in exchange rates of currency since 2002.  
 
The accused person who was using the password ID.W 17 F, had been buying and 
selling USD at unapproved exchange rates. He posted in the system fictitious 
transactions that would reduce the balance of cash in records but the actual cash in 
his custody would not change. He would then pocket the difference and the actual 
cash would again tally with the balance of cash in records. As said above, the 
fictitious records started to be posted by the accused person from May 2002 to May 
2003. He made several such false entries and each one made up an offence and a 
total number of entries rose to 353 automatically giving rise to the same number of 
counts.
126
  
 
The amount of money that had been pocketed by the accused up to the time the 
fraudulent transactions were discovered was Tshs 434, 816, 650/=. The false records 
would show that there were purchases of United States Dollars at high rates and 
sold the same at lower rates. Two examples can be taken to illustrate how the fraud 
was committed. First, on 10
th
 May 2003, the accused person made entries showing 
that USD 6800 was bought at the rate of Tsh. 1,120/= and sold at the rate of Tshs. 
980/= each whereas the approved rates were Tshs. 1,015 and Tshs. 1038 for buying 
and selling respectively. It was this transaction that prompted investigation by the 
Internal Audit Department of CRDB at the Headquarters of the bank in Dar es 
Salaam.  
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Second, on 15
th
 January, 2003, the accused purported to have bought USD 
38,000.00 at Tshs. 41,079,500/= using the rate of 1,067.00  instead of the approved 
rate of Tshs. 985 for each USD. Since the posting was a mere book entry as there 
was no actual purchase of dollars, his actual cash position remained the same as 
before posting this transaction but records showed that USD balance went up by 
38,500 and Tshs. balance decreased to 41,079,500/=. After this fictitious purchase 
transaction, he posted another transaction but this was for sale of the same amount 
of dollars.  
 
This transaction indicated that he sold USD 38,500.00 at Tshs. 36,190,000/=. The 
rate he used was 940 instead of 1,005. This was again a mere book posting because 
there was no actual receipt of and payment of cash and the actual cash position did 
not change. After this transaction, the cash records showed that he paid out USD 
38,500.00, the amount he bought in the previous transaction and received Tshs. 
36,190,000/=. The USD balance was, therefore, reduced by 38,500.00 and Tshs. 
balance was increased by 36,190,000/=. The net effect of the two transactions as 
reflected in the cash records is that there would be no change of USD balance 
whereas the Tshs balance would decrease by 4,88,500, i.e, 41,079, 500/= minus 
36,190,000/=.  
 
Regarding the operation of the computer system, the court was told that the bank 
operations were entered and stored in particular soft-ware systems which had a 
Banks Master as the central server for all CRDB bank transactions country-wide. 
Each branch of the bank had a network that linked cashiers/tellers and their 
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supervisors, super-users, branch controller and branch manager. Each branch had 
also a server called Branch Power which was capable of storing record/report for 
some time and the main server (Bank Master) received the record sent from the 
Branch Power. 
 
 In order to be able to work using the system, each staff of the bank had his/her 
password that identified him. It was this password that authorized a staff to operate 
transactions in the system and that the password was confidential. It could not be 
altered or changed without the awareness of the user. There were different levels 
and limits in using the system. The limit for the accused person was 5,000,000/=. 
However, as facts show above, he exceeded this limit without being authorized.  
 
The procedure for purchasing foreign exchange (forex) was that a customer had to 
see the Departmental Manager or the customer advisor with relevant documents. 
When the departmental manager or the customer advisor was satisfied, he/she 
forwarded the forex request amount requested to the cashier/teller. The cashier/teller 
fed the system with the data and forwarded the same to the supervisor /departmental 
manager and then to the Branch Manager for authorization and approval of the 
transaction. When the transaction was approved, the vouchers were then printed but 
where there was no such approval the transaction could not be completed in the 
system. In the event the cashier/teller fed the system with a wrong rate of forex, the 
Branch Power would reject it by displaying the message “Invalid Exchange Rate”. 
The rate was centrally controlled by the Bank Master and could not be altered by the 
Teller.  
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The question before the court was how was it possible for the invalid exchange rates 
to be accepted by the Bank Master without sending back the message to the 
users/management? The computer expert from the headquarters told the court that 
the record was electronically received by the Bank Master when the system was 
offline. The defense contended that the computer system could not work properly 
while it was offline. Were the computer system online, the fraudulent transactions 
would not be made because the system operator at the headquarters could have 
discovered the same. The prosecution alleged that the fraudulent transactions were 
made during the time when the system was offline. During this time when the 
system was off-line, the transactions by- pass the branch power or server and are 
communicated directly to the main server at the headquarters, leaving the branch 
manager without any means to verify and authorize transactions. 
 
It was stated in court that the fraudulent transactions should have been discovered 
by the branch supervisor who was supposed to approve transactions operated by the 
accused person. However, it was pointed out that the supervisor colluded with the 
accused person by giving him rights to edit entries in the computer system. Each 
transaction required vouchers and investigation revealed that the accused had no 
vouchers to support the transactions and that the false entries could not be 
discovered because the accused deleted the entries in the system before the 
supervisor printed the daily reports.  
 
In his defense, the accused told the trial court that the procedure when a client buys 
foreign currency from the bank is that the customer has to see the customer adviser 
who, if satisfied that the client meets the laid down requirements, receives and 
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forwards the supporting documents to the departmental manager for approval. 
Where the teller does not have enough amount of foreign exchange needed by any 
customer, he issues a treasury out-slip requesting for extra currency from the strong 
room. The amount has to be recorded in the cash amount register. The sale 
transaction is then posted to the computer and referred to the departmental manager 
for approval before the Teller’s account is debited. It is after this step that the 
voucher is printed and the client signs the same. The teller also signs and issues one 
copy to the client while the bank retains the other. The accused told the court that it 
was not possible for him to vary the exchange rate because the computer system 
would reject and indicate “invalid exchange rate”. 
 
Acquitting the accused, the Resident Magistrate based his reasoning on doubts in 
the operation of the system. The fact that the supervisor had access to the accused 
person’s computer made the magistrate doubt whether the false entries were made 
by the accused or the supervisor. The relevant section of the judgment reads as 
follows: 
“I, however, hasten to point out that in the system of maintenance, the 
super-user and branch manager have the facility to break and change the 
cashier/teller passwords. Furthermore, as it is conceded that the super-user 
had capacity of controlling end of the day reports and authorizing 
transaction, I am inclined to believe that the super user and branch manager 
smoke screed the fraudulent transaction in the user ID and cash amount of 
the accused.” 
 
 Furthermore, the fact that the computer should have been operated while it is online 
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cast doubts whether the entries were actually made. For purpose of clarity a section 
of the judgment to this effect reads as follows: The super user had the gigantic 
powers over transactions. I don’t think if the branch overshadowed on the fact that 
those powers could have the negative effects on transactions. 
 
PW.4 has contended that it was possible to post the transaction while the system 
was offline. It is surprising, this contention does not appear in the 
audit/investigation report (Exh.P90). It was not specifically explained as to when 
and what caused the system to be offline. Albeit, I am not a computer software 
technician, I understand that whenever the system is offline there cannot be 
dissipation of transaction. But, when online the exchange rate cannot be tempered 
with otherwise it will indicate the word “invalid exchange rate” and instantly will 
forward the same as referral to the supervisor or super user who could authorize the 
same. 
 
The doubt that the trial magistrate had was how could the rates that had not been 
approved pass through the system? In other words, how could the accused person 
exceed his limit? The trial magistrate formed an opinion that This case was a fit one 
for conspiracy, so to say. The prosecution side will agree with me in that the 
accused in his position as a cashier/teller couldn’t interfere with the exchange rate 
restriction system unless otherwise there was cooperation with other senior Bank 
officials. In absence of the evidence of conspiracy, this creates a lacuna in 
prosecution case, which, in reality is fundamental in that it goes deep to the roots of 
prosecution case. 
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Based on the reasons above, the trial magistrate acquitted the accused person for 
lack of sufficient evidence to prove the charges of fraudulent false accounting and 
stealing by servant. The Republic, aggrieved with the decision by the trial court, 
appealed to the High Court of Tanzania, Tanga Registry. One of the grounds of 
appeal was that the trial magistrate erred in fact and law in holding that the 
fraudulent transactions could not pass through the Bank Computer system while the 
system was offline. Arguing this ground of appeal, the state attorney in his 
submissions told the High Court Judge who heard the appeal that the evidence of a 
computer expert PW 4 one Ambwene  Andrea was clear that the computer system 
could work offline and allow invalid exchange rates to pass through the system. 
 
The High Court Judge posed the question as to how the computer system could 
allow the invalid rates to pass on without sending the message to supervisors. The 
learned judge was, however, convinced with the expert witness to the effect that it 
was possible for the main server to have records directly from the branch server in it 
despite the system being offline. What she doubted was the fact that all the 
fraudulent entries were made during the days when the system was offline. 
However, the Judge formed an opinion that the accused had conspired with one of 
his supervisors, who was a super-user at the Branch namely Tryphone Muchunguzi. 
According to the Judge, Muchunguzi was in control of the Branch Power and was 
charged with printing daily reports and he must have concealed the fraudulent 
transactions made by the accused.  
 
On powers of the super-users, supervisors and bank managers, the Judge was of the 
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view that despite the fact that the same can inquire, post static data, authorize 
referrals, change passwords, currency refresh and remove lock out flags, the 
evidence shows that they cannot do so without the knowledge of the users. At the 
end, the passwords remain a secret to the user. 
 
The Judge formed a further opinion that the accused person had admitted tempering 
with the exchange rates in the computer system and when a transaction he posted on 
10
th
 May, 2003 was discovered, he reversed the same to reflect the correct rates. The 
relevant part of the High Court Judgment reads as follows: This is contained in Exh. 
P. E. 88 where the respondent reversed the Teller log to record the correct 
authorized rates in respect of 10/5/2003. The respondent reversed the entries on 
15/5/2003 to reflect the correct rates of Tshs.1015/= @ USD for buying and shs. 
1038/= USD for selling. Initially, the respondent had posted figures showing that 
the rates were shs. 1,120/= for buying and shs.980/= for selling as they were on 
10/5/2003. 
 
Based on the above facts, the Judge concluded as follows: In my considered view, 
this is an evidence that the respondent fed the computer system with wrong 
entries/exchange rates. Again it is on evidence that by using the un-authorized 
exchange rate, there was a difference of 940,000/=. This amount was alleged to 
have been stolen from that transaction. PW. 1 testified to  the trial court that having 
discovered the fraud in the transaction, and the respondent having admitted, the 
latter also admitted that he was ready to pay the difference.   
On  conspiracy, the Judge found as follows: 
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The record shows that the prosecution testified that the respondent managed to 
defraud the bank only when the late Tryphone Muchunguzi was on duty. The 
evidence is to the effect that when any of the two were on leave no such fraud was 
detected in the branch transactions. If the password was confidential to an 
individual, then the data reflecting the ID.No. W.17.F could not be processed and 
sent in the absence of the respondent even if Muchunguzi the super-user, was on 
duty.  
Likewise, when Muchunguzi was on duty no fraud was reported or detected from 
W.17.F as the user was not active in his account. All these facts taken together, they 
lead to the proof and conclusion that the two had conspired to commit the fraudulent 
accounting in the bank. Allowing the appeal and convicting the accused, the Judge 
said: 
“I am therefore convinced by the evidence on record that the prosecution 
managed to prove beyond doubt the offences of fraudulent false accounting in 
counts Nos: 346, 347, 348 and 349 and stealing by servant in count No.350”.  
 
The appeal is therefore allowed to this extent only. The acquittal in respect of these 
counts is set aside and replaced by a conviction. The respondent is therefore 
convicted accordingly. 
 
Following the above decision by the High Court, the defense has lodged an appeal 
to the Court appeal, which is pending to date. Despite the fact that the appeal has 
not yet been determined, this decision of the High Court may be criticized on a 
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number of grounds. First, an analysis of the law that was used to charge the accused 
was not made. The question that the court ought to have asked itself was whether 
the offence of stealing could be committed when the evidence showed that it was 
only data that had been manipulated.  
 
Even if the end result of the transaction was to benefit the accused in terms of 
monetary value, yet the elements that  constitute the offence of stealing should have 
been discussed and a determination whether the elements existed in the case before 
the court ought to have been made. Second, the procedure for authentication and 
authorization of banking transactions in electronic form should have been given a 
judicial pronouncement.  
 
In the case before the court, the use of passwords as a method of authenticating 
transactions was in issue. The question would be: was the use of passwords 
authorized by law? This question was relevant because there was a contention by 
the defense that the super user could as well access the accused person’s password 
and effect any changes. The third question is in relation to admissibility of computer 
generated evidence. The use of e-banking technologies, as said earlier in this Study, 
dispenses with the use of paper. Data messages or electronically generated 
documents have now found way to courts of law to prove or disprove a fact in issue. 
The high court ought to have made a determination whether the evidence generated 
by computers or electronic bank records were admissible and if admissible, how 
would security, authentication and reliability be determined. These issues were left 
for determination, perhaps by the Court of Appeal when hearing the appeal arising 
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from this decision.  
 
The relevance of bringing these incidents to light which led to massive losses of 
both banks’ and customers’ money is three fold. First, in order for electronic funds 
transfer involving huge amounts of money to be successful, there must in most 
cases be an involvement of an employee of the bank. Second, the customers’ monies 
in banks are not safe due to the presence of unfaithful employees, who have access 
to customers’ accounts information. Third, bank customers may conspire with 
employees of the banks in order to allow crime to be perpetrated using their 
accounts. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 The aim of this chapter was to lay a conceptual framework for electronic banking.  
It defined e-crime and identified a few incidents of cyber crimes at the  international  
level, the purpose being to lay a foundation for recommendations of a suitable legal 
framework in Tanzania. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.0 LEGAL FRAMEWORK ON CYBER CRIME 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this Chapter is to present a discussion on how the penal laws address 
the cyber crimes in Tanzania. It will show that the existing legal framework on 
criminal law has no such offences referred to as cyber crimes. It is doubtful whether 
the existing principles on criminal law designed to regulate paper –based 
transactions can apply to theft and frauds in electronic banking. However, this point 
is being increasingly recognized as an area of concern and more and more countries 
are, therefore, enacting specific and comprehensive legislation to cover the acts of 
computer criminals. 
 
3.2. Cyber Crime Legislation in Africa 
The East Africa region includes Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, while the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) region includes Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
South Africa, Malawiand Mozambique. The SADC region started harmonizing 
cyber crime laws in 2006 to deal with cross-border criminals. The new laws allow 
member countries to prosecute cybercriminals despite where the crime was 
committed in the SADC region.  
 
However, progress has been slow in several countries, such as: Kenya and Uganda 
who have not proposed draft laws to their respective parliaments. Mauritius, South 
Africa and Zambia have adopted cyber crime legislation. Botswana finally has a 
cyber crime law, passed by Parliament in December 2007 and signed into law by 
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President Festus Mogae later in the same month.127 
 
3.3 Legal Framework on Cybercrimes in Tanzania 
As pointed out above, persons who used mobile phones and ATM cards to transfer 
money from other persons’ accounts in Tanzania have been charged with the 
offence of theft contrary to section 265 of the Penal Code, Cap. 16. This provision 
reads as follows: 
“Any person who steals anything capable of being stolen is guilty of theft, 
and is liable, unless owing to the circumstances of the theft or the nature of 
the thing stolen, some other punishment is provided, to imprisonment for 
seven years.” 
 
It appears that the above section does not create the offence of theft; it rather 
provides punishment for the offence. The provisions that create the offence of theft 
are sections 257 and 258. Section 258 defines the offence of theft while section 257 
stipulates things that are capable of being stolen. The elements of the offence of 
theft according to section 258 consist of anything capable of being stolen, act of 
appropriation, a certain type of property, unlawfulness and intention, including an 
intention to appropriate. 
 
The actus reus of the offence of theft is aspiration, which is referred to as the 
physical handling of the thing or property.  This property or thing must be capable 
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of being stolen.
128
 The obvious requirements that the thing must meet before being 
capable of being stolen are that it must be movable, it must be corporeal and it must 
belong to someone else.
129
 
 
From the elements of the offence of theft only tangible things that are capable of 
being moved from one place to another may be stolen. That being the case, it is 
questionable whether or not theft may be committed in e-banking transactions.  As 
stated earlier in Chapter Two of this study, computers are currently used to process, 
store and disseminate data involving monetary value. When a person accesses a 
computer or an intelligent device, he has a number of motives, one being to transfer 
money. At that time he is moving data with monetary value and later he accesses 
money using an ATM machine. It is doubtful whether information or data could 
qualify as a subject of theft. This is a lacuna in the legal system in Tanzania. It is 
argued in this study that the law must define the term ‘property’ or ‘thing’ to include 
incorporeal property or thing in order to render data or information capable of being 
stolen. 
 
The closest offences in relation to computer data theft are unauthorized access to the 
computer and unauthorized access with ulterior intent. The Malaysian experience as 
discussed in Chapter Three provides a clear guidance on how these offences may be 
related to the offence of theft in the Penal Code. In Malaysia section 3(1) of the 
Computer Crimes Act 1997 creates an offence of unauthorized access and section 4 
(1) and (2) of the Act creates an offence of unauthorized access with ulterior intent. 
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It is this law that provides for a legal basis to punish a person who secures the 
unauthorized access to a bank’s computer in order to divert funds into his bank 
account maintained in another bank. It also punishes a person who secures the 
unauthorized access to a bank’s computer and instructs the bank’s computer to 
round down the interest calculated on all interest-bearing accounts, and the excess 
funds diverted to his/her personal account. 
 
 It is argued in this study that without laying a clear basis for punishment of crimes 
in relation to computers and other intelligent devices used by banks to store 
monetary values, any claim that one has used a mobile phone or an ATM card to 
steal or transfer money may lack any legal basis. 
 
As also observed above, suspects of e-crimes in Tanzania are also charged with the 
offence of forgery contrary to sections 333, 335(a) and (d), (i) and 338 of the Penal 
Code, Cap 16. Forgery in banks can take a number of forms. First, a person forges a 
transfer statement that authorizes movement of funds from one account to another. 
The form in this respect is paper-based, but the actual transfer is done electronically, 
different to when a cheque is involved. Once the form is accepted by the bank the 
transfer becomes instantaneous and it cannot be reversed.  
 
The second type of forgery is when a person counterfeits someone’s plastic card and 
uses it to withdraw funds from the account belonging to that person. For access to 
the account to be possible, the thief or fraudster must have knowledge of the 
person’s PIN or Code. The third is when a person sends electronic instructions to 
authorize transfer of funds whereas he has no such authority to do so. For example, 
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a person may send an email to the bank instructing it to transfer funds from  one 
account to another. A good example is the officer of the Tanzania Revenue 
Authority who purported to be an accountant of the Tanzania Telecommunication 
Company and instructed the NBC bank to transfer millions of money to various 
accounts held in a number of banks.
130
 
 
Section 333 of the Penal Code defines the offence of forgery as the “making of a 
false document with intent to defraud or to deceive.” From the provision of section 
335 of this law, a person would be guilty of the offence of forgery if he 
(i) Makes a document which is false or which he has reason to believe is 
untrue; 
(ii) Alters a document without authority in such a manner that if the 
alteration had been authorized it would have altered the effect of the 
document;  
(iii) Introduces into a document without authority, whilst it is being 
drawn up, matter which if it had been authorized would have altered 
the effect of the document; 
(iv) Signs a document– 
(v) In the name of any person without his authority, whether such name 
is or is not the same as that of the person signing; 
(vi) In the name of any fictitious person alleged to exist whether the 
fictitious person is or is not alleged to be of the same name as the 
person signing; 
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(vii) In the name represented as being the name of a different person from 
that of the person signing it and intended to be mistaken for the name 
of that person; 
(viii) In the name of a person personated by the person signing the 
document, provided that the effect of the instrument depends upon 
the identity between the person signing the document and the person 
whom he professes to be. 
 
From the provisions of the law in relation to forgery as pointed out above, it is 
arguable whether criminals who transferred funds using electronic messages that 
have been forged or cards that have been counterfeited can be brought to justice. 
The above provisions relate to forgery of documents and it is certain under the 
current law that a document does not include an electronic message, data or 
document. It is argued in this study that the Penal Code Act needs to be amended to 
clarify this aspect, particularly when new technologies make it possible for the 
offence of fraud to be committed using computers and computer networks. The 
issue that haunts the court is whether computer fraud amounts to forgery.  
 
As indicated above, the offence of money laundering is charged under sections 3, 
12(b) and 13 (a) of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, No. 12 of 2006. Sections 12(b) 
creates the offence of money laundering in the following words 
 12. A person who –  
  (a) … 
(b) Converts, transfers, transports or transmits property while he 
knows or ought to know or ought to have known that such property is 
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the proceeds of a predicate offence, for the purpose of concealing, 
disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person 
who is involved in the commission of such offence to evade the legal 
consequences of his actions. 
(c) . . . 
(d). . . 
(e). . . 
 
A list of predicate offences is given under section 3 of the Act, some of which are 
illicit drugs trafficking, terrorism, illicit arms trafficking, corrupt practices, 
counterfeiting, armed robbery, theft, forgery, tax evasion, illegal mining and 
environmental crimes. A person who is guilty of the offence of money laundering 
shall be sentenced to a fine not exceeding five hundred million shillings and not less 
than one hundred million shillings or to a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten 
years and not less than five years.
131
 There is no mention of electronic crimes in the 
list and one wonders why the omission despite the Act being enacted in 2006 when 
ICT had already gained a very important place in the operations of banking 
business. 
 
As seen above, the culprits transfer money electronically from one account to 
another with ease, instantaneously and without the ability to trace it. It is doubtful 
whether the interpretation of the term “transfer” includes an electronic transfer. This 
doubt is justified by the fact that the Act makes no mention of electronic transfer. 
Indeed, it does not even define the term ‘transfer’. 
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Where the offence of money laundering has been committed, section 65B of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act empowers a police officer above the rank of Superintendent 
to have access to computer data in order to obtain evidence in relation to 
commission of the crime of money laundering. This nature of evidence seems to be 
admissible under the new amendment to the Evidence Act of 1967 as discussed 
above. The challenges revolving around this kind of evidence, generated by 
computers, are reliability, security and authenticity.  
 
Section 116 of the Electronic and Portal communication run as follows: 
i. Any person who installs, operates, constructs, maintains, owns or makes 
available network facilities without obtaining any relevant individual 
license, commits an offence and shall be liable upon conviction to a fine of 
not less than five million Tanzanian shillings or imprisonment for a term not 
less than twelve months or to both. 
ii. Any person who provides network services without obtaining any relevant 
individual license, commits an offence and  shall be liable upon conviction 
to a fine of not less than six million Tanzanian shillings or imprisonment for 
a term not less than twelve months or to both. 
 
iii. Any person who – 
(a) Provides application services without having first obtained any relevant 
individual   license; 
(b) Provides content services without having first obtained any relevant 
individual license, or any  relevant class license commits an offence and 
shall be liable upon conviction to a fine of not less than five million 
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Tanzanian shillings or imprisonment  for a term not less than  twelve months 
or to both; 
(c)  Imports, distributes, or sells electronic communication equipment or 
apparatus or;     establishes, installs, maintains and operates an electronic 
communication system or imports non   type approved electronic 
communication equipment or apparatus into the United Republic without a 
license, commits an offence and shall be liable upon conviction to a fine of 
not less than five million Tanzanian shillings or imprisonment for a term not 
less than twelve months or to both.  
 
Section 118 of the Electronic and Postal Communication Act
132
  makes an offence 
to create obscene communication like child pornography and other offence of such 
nature. Section 118 of the same Act run as hereunder, 
Any person who- 
i. By means of any network facilities, network services, applications services or 
content services, knowingly makes, creates, or solicits or initiates the 
transmission of any comment, request, suggestion or other communication 
which is obscene, indecent, false, menacing or offensive in character with 
intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person; 
ii. Initiates a communication using any applications services, whether 
continuously, repeatedly or otherwise, during which communication may or 
may not ensue, with or without disclosing his identity and with intent to 
annoy, abuse, threatens or harass any person at any number or electronic 
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address; 
By means of any network services or applications service provides any 
obscene        communication to any person; or 
iii. Permits any network services or application services under the person’s 
control to be used for an activity described in section 117 (3),commits an 
offence and shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine not less than five million 
Tanzanian shillings or to imprisonment for a term not less than twelve 
months, or to both and shall also be liable to fine of seven hundred and fifty 
thousand Tanzanian shillings for every day during which the offence is 
continued after conviction. 
iv. Section 120 of the Electronic and Postal Communication Act133 creates a 
penalty for interception of communication and it provides that: Any person 
who, without lawful authority under this Act or any other written law- 
Penalty for interception of communications 
(a)  Intercepts, attempts to intercept, or procures any other person to 
intercept or attempt to intercept any communications; or 
(b)  Discloses, or attempts to disclose to any other person the contents of 
any communications, knowingly or having reason to believe that the 
information was obtained through the interception of any 
communications in contravention of this section; or 
(c)  uses, or attempts to use the contents of any communications, 
knowingly having reason to believe that the information was 
obtained through the interception of any communications in 
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contravention of this section, commits an offence and shall, on 
conviction, be liable to a fine of not less than five million Tanzanian 
shillings or to imprisonment for a term not less than twelve months, 
or to both. 
 
Under that Section 120
134
 the penalty is imposed if there is date interception the 
penalty inflicted is Tshs 5,000,000 or 12 months imprisonment or both fine and 
imprisonment. Here punishment as compared with International Law is left to the 
member state, the Convention never intend to punish criminals but creates only the 
offence under the cyberspace. Jurisdiction under the cyberspace is left to the 
member state after creating its own cyber law and other procedural law or rules. 
 
Section 122
135
 deals with fraud with dishonest intent while Section 124
136
 deals with 
illegal access to computer system like in the Budapest Convention. Section 123
137
 
inflicts penalty to a person for interference of electronic communication to be a fine 
of not less than Tshs 5 million or 2 years imprisonment or both fine and 
punishment. This is not the case to the Convention. If we can consider the Indian 
domestic law particular Section 43 of the Information Technology Act
138
. Which is 
national law of India creates a penalty like our law for damages for the computer 
and computer system. The criminal is liable to pay damages by way of 
compensation for the sum not exceeding 1 crone rupees to the victim. Section 43 
provides as hereunder: If any person without permission of the owner or any other 
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person who is in-charge of a computer, computer system or computer network, 
i. Accesses or secures access to such computer, computer system or computer 
network; 
ii. Downloads, copies or extracts any data, computer data base or information 
from such computer, computer system or computer network including 
information or data held or stored in any removable storage medium; 
iii. Introduces or causes to be introduced any computer contaminant or 
computer virus into any computer, computer system or computer network; 
iv. Damages or causes to be damaged any computer, computer system or 
computer network, data, computer data base or any other programmes 
residing in such computer, computer system or computer network; 
v. Disrupts or causes disruption of any computer, computer system or computer 
network; 
vi. Denies or causes the denial of access to any person authorized to access any 
computer, computer system or computer network by any means; 
vii. Provides any assistance to any person to facilitate access to a computer, 
computer system or computer network in contravention of the provisions of 
this Act, rules or regulations made there-under; 
viii. Charges the services availed of by a person to the account of another 
person by tampering with or manipulating any computer, computer system, 
or computer network, he shall be liable to pay damages by way of 
compensation not exceeding one crore rupees  to the person so affected. 
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As Mwiburi,
139
 pointed out, cybercrimes are intermingled with electronic commerce 
like e- signature, digital signature, digital devices and e-contracts and that they 
ought to have been addressed because they are very important. It is argued here that 
the legal regime in Tanzania in respect of cyber crimes is still wanting and that 
EPOCA has not addressed all the issues in respect of cyber crimes, hence, 
inadequate because it leaves a big lacuna in the legal regime on cybercrimes.  
 
3.4 Conclusion 
As observed above, detailed rules exist in relation to theft and frauds in paper -based 
transactions. It is noted that computer crime detection are a difficult task. Bringing 
the criminals to book becomes a formidable challenge since the laws in many 
countries have not kept pace with technology. Laws were originally designed to 
protect tangible assets and may not be sufficient to guarantee the protection of 
electronic bits of data. It is often difficult to attribute guilt using the existing statutes 
since the act of trespassing into a system and tampering with virtual data may not 
necessarily be specifically provided for in law. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.0 LESSONS FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
As noted in Chapter Two of this Work, criminals use computers and computer 
networks to perpetuate their ill motives like accessing customers’ accounts and 
making fraudulent transfers. In most incidents, huge losses are caused by this 
unauthorized access either to banks or customers. It is this problem that Bainbridge 
regards as having spurred on legislative activity to create new criminal laws or to 
strengthen existing ones.
140
 This Chapter will analyse how other jurisdictions have 
addressed cyber crimes by use of legislation 
 
4.2The need for Legislation on Cyber Crimes 
The world first computer specific law was enacted in the year 1970 by the German 
State of Hesse in the form of ‘Data Protection Act, 1970’ with the advancement of 
cyber technology. With the emergence of technology the misuse of technology has 
also expanded to its optimum level and then there arises a need of strict statutory 
laws to regulate the criminal activities in the cyber world and to protect 
technological advancement system.
141
 
 
4.3 The Position in Malaysia 
In Malaysia, the Computer Crimes Act 1997 provides for offences relating to the 
misuse of computers. The Act makes it an offence if there is an unauthorized access 
to computer systems and the use of computer systems for fraudulent purposes. The 
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Act also provides that the commission of these offences extraterritorially (that is, 
outside Malaysia) is punishable. Section 9(1) of the Computer Crimes Act 1997 
states that the provisions of this Act shall, in relation to any person, whatever his 
nationality or citizenship, have effect outside as well as within Malaysia, and where 
an offence under this Act is committed by any person in any place outside Malaysia, 
he may be dealt with in respect of such offence as if it was committed at any place 
within Malaysia. 
 
Section 2 of the Act defines the word ‘computer’ as an electronic, magnetic, optical, 
electrochemical, or other data processing device, or a group of such interconnected 
or related devices, performing logical, arithmetic, storage and display functions, and 
includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or 
operating in conjunction with such device or group of such interconnected or related 
devices, but does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, or a portable 
hand held calculator or other similar device which is non-programmable or which 
does not contain any data storage facility.  
“Computer network” means The interconnection of communication lines 
and circuits with a computer or a complex consisting of two or more 
interconnected computers”.  
 
Section 2(10) of the Act provides further that “any reference in this Act to a 
computer includes a reference to a computer network. The Computer Crimes Act 
1997 defines “data” as “representations of information or of concepts that are being 
prepared or have been prepared in a form suitable for use in a computer”. And, the 
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word “program” means data representing instructions or statements that, when 
executed in a computer, causes the computer to perform a function. 
 
Section 3(1) of the Computer Crimes Act 1997 creates an offence of unauthorized 
access. It provides that a person shall be guilty of an offence if: (a) he causes a 
computer to perform any function with intent to secure access to any program or 
data held in any computer; (b) the access he intends to secure is unauthorized; and 
(c) he knows at the time when he causes the computer to perform the function that 
that is the case. 
 
Section 3(2) of the Act provides that  
“The intent a person has to have to commit an offence under this section 
need not be directed at: (a) any particular program or data; (b) a program 
or data of any particular kind; or (c) a program or data held in any 
particular computer” 
 
The Computer Crimes Act 1997 defines the scope and meaning of “unauthorized 
access” in section 2(2) and (5). The burden of proof on the prosecution is made 
easier by section 8 of the Act, which provides: A person who has in his custody or 
control any program, data or other information which is held in any computer or 
retrieved from any computer which he is not authorized to have in his custody or 
control shall be deemed to have obtained unauthorized access to such program, data 
or information unless the contrary is proven. Therefore, once it is proven that the 
accused has custody or control of the program, data or other information and that he 
or she was not duly authorized, the accused has to prove otherwise.  
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Thus, what constitutes “custody or control” is important. The learned Gunn Chit 
Tuan J. (as he then was) in Public Prosecutor v Ang Boon Foo
142
 held that control 
must connote something more than mere knowledge of the thing in question. That 
something is an element of dominion over the material. It must be shown that the 
person who had knowledge of its whereabouts had also access to it and could at any 
opportune moment of his choice have obtained possession of it or the capacity to 
direct its disposal. The Court here referred to the Australian case, Johnston Fear 
and Kingham v Commonwealth,
143which held that the word “control” is “wide 
enough to include many types of possession which are not commensurate with full 
ownership”. 
 
The Court also made reference to the English case, Dolfus Mieg Er Compagnie SA v 
Bank of England,
144
 which held that “control” would cover the right to tell the 
possessor what is to be done with the property. On the other hand, the word 
“custody” appears to require an element of care or guardianship. In the Singapore 
case of Ho Seng Seng v Rex,
145
 Brown Ag CJ held: “I would adopt the following 
definitions of “custody” and “possession” given by the eminent American jurist, 
Roscoe Pound, in his Introduction to American Law:  
 
Custody is a mere condition of fact, a mere physical holding of or physical control 
over the thing. Where custody (exercised by oneself or by another) is coupled with 
the mental element of holding for one’s own purpose, there is possession.” The 
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above passage was cited in Neo Koon Cheo v Reg
146
 by Ambrose J. In Public 
Prosecutor v Ang Boon Foo
147
 Gunn Chit Tuan J (as he then was) made the 
following distinction between the words “custody” and “possession”: “The main 
distinction between custody and possession is that a custodian has not the power of 
disposal. The statement that “possession must be exclusive” is often due to 
confusion of the fact to be proved, with the evidence by which it is to be proved. It 
is essential to keep this distinction clearly in mind, especially when applying 
presumptions.” 
 
In other words, a person is said to have custody over an article if he has de facto 
possession of it or has care over it. Thus, a person is said to have “control” over a 
program, data or other information if he knows of its existence and has dominion 
over the person in whose possession the program, data or information is found. And, 
a person is said to have “custody” if the factual situation points to the accused 
exercising some care over the item. 
 
The prosecution must prove either the element of “custody” or “control” since 
section 3 uses the word “or”. If neither element is proven then the presumption in 
section 8, as stated above, will not apply. The maximum sentence, stipulated in 
section 3(3), Computer Crimes Act 1997 which a court may impose under this 
section is a term of imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or a fine of up to 
RM50,000.00 or both such a fine and imprisonment. 
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Section 4 (1) and (2) of the Computer Crimes Act 1997 creates an offence of 
unauthorised access with ulterior Intent. It states that “(1) A person shall be guilty of 
an offence under this section if he commits an offence referred to in section 3 with 
intent –(a) to commit an offence involving fraud or dishonesty or which causes 
injury as defined in the Penal Code; or (b) to facilitate the commission of such an 
offence whether by himself or by any other person. 
 
Thus, the offence, which this section creates, is limited to those offences which 
involve  fraud or dishonesty or which cause injury as defined in the Penal Code.
148
 
Examples of section 4(1)(a) offences are: (1) A person secures the unauthorized 
access to a bank’s computer in order to divert funds into his bank account 
maintained in another bank; or (2) A person secures the unauthorized access to a 
bank’s computer and instructs the bank’s computer to round down the interest 
calculated on all interest-bearing accounts, and the excess funds of half seen be 
diverted to his personal account; Such person can be said to have committed theft 
under the Penal Code and would have committed offences under both sections 3 (for 
the unauthorized access) and 4 of the Computer Crimes Act 1997. 
 
Section 4(1)(b) requires the person securing access “to facilitate the commission of 
such an offence whether by himself or by any other person”. Section 4(3) provides 
that a person guilty of the section 4 offence shall on conviction be liable to a fine 
not exceeding RM150,000.00 or to imprisonment of up to 10 years or to both. 
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Section 5(1) creates the offence of unauthorized modification of contents of 
computer. It renders it an offence if a person who does “any act which he knows 
will cause unauthorized modification of the contents of any computer.” An essential 
element of this offence is knowledge. In the case of Lai Fook Kee v Public 
Prosecutor
149
 the court relied on two authorities for the definition of the word 
“knows” and stated thus: “In London Computator Ltd v Seymour150 it was held that 
the word “knows” bears its ordinary meaning and is not so to be construed as “ought 
to have known”. In Sinniah Sokkan v Public Prosecutor,151  
 
Gill J (as he then was) was considering the meaning of “knowingly made a false 
statement” and he stated: “… it must not only be proved that the statement was false 
but also that it was conscientiously made and known to be false”. In the absence of 
specific finding … of personal knowledge by the appellant that the statement which 
he gave was false, the conviction cannot stand and the appellant must be acquitted.” 
 
Besides having to prove that the accused had personal knowledge that the access 
was unauthorized, it must also be proved that there was an “act”. Thus, examples of 
acts, which may constitute offences under this section, include: (1) deliberately 
closing of a word processing program without saving the changes made to the 
information by moving the mouse or by switching off the power supply; (2) 
introducing a “worm” program into the computer system so that by adding 
programs or data to the computer’s content, all the spare capacity in the computer is 
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used up; and (3) intentionally introducing a computer “virus” into the system. 
 
Subsections 5(2) and (3) of the Computer Crimes Act 1997 go on to provide: “(2) 
For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial that the act in question is not 
directed at – (a) any particular program or data; (b) a program or data of any kind; 
or (c) a program or data held in any particular computer. (3) For the purposes of this 
section, it is immaterial whether an unauthorized modification is, or is intended to 
be, permanent or merely temporary.” 
 
Section 2(7) explains what “modification” in this context means:  “[A] modification 
of the contents of any computer takes place if, by the operation of any function of 
the computer concerned or any other computer – (a) any program or data held in the 
computer concerned is altered or erased; (b) any program or data is introduced or 
added to its contents; or (c) any event occurs which impairs the normal operation of 
any computer, and any act that contributes towards causing such a modification 
shall be regarded as causing it.” 
 
Thus, a modification occurs where a function
152
 of the “target” computer itself is 
operated. Subsection 2(8) goes on to provide that such modification is 
“unauthorized” if: “(a) the person whose act causes it is not himself entitled to 
determine whether the modification should be made; and (b) he does not have 
consent to the modification from any person who is so entitled.” 
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 A “function” is defined in section 2(1) as including “logic, control, arithmetic, deletion, storage 
and retrieval and communication or telecommunication to, from or within a computer”. 
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Section 5(3) provides that it is immaterial whether an unauthorized modification is, 
or is intended to be, permanent or merely temporary. The section would catch mere 
transient forays into another computer’s system if there were an unauthorized 
modification. A person guilty of a section 5 offence shall on conviction be liable to 
a fine not exceeding RM100,000.00 or to imprisonment for a term of up to 7 years 
or to both. The penalty is enhanced, to a maximum fine of RM150,000.00 or 
maximum imprisonment of 10 years or to both, if the act is done with the intention 
of causing injury as defined in the Penal Code.
153
 
 
Section 6 creates the offence unauthorized communication of codes or passwords. It 
makes it an offence to communicate directly or indirectly a number, code, password 
or other means of access to a computer to any unauthorized person. A person guilty 
of this offence shall on conviction be liable to a maximum fine of RM25,000.00 or 
to imprisonment for a term of up to 3 years or to both. 
 
As the marginal note of this section and the Explanatory Notes to the Computer 
Crimes Act 1997 use the words “wrongful communications”, it is submitted that an 
offence under section 6 cannot be committed by inadvertence. Means area 
(intention) is necessary to make it an offence to wrongfully communicate the 
number, code, password, etc. to an unauthorized third party. 
 
The other element to be proven is the information given (in the form of a number, 
code, password or other means) has the effect of enabling the third person (who is 
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 Section 5(4), Computer Crimes Act 1997. 
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unauthorized to do so) to gain access to a computer. Bankers, in particular, should 
take heed of this section as the scope of this provision is very wide and would cover 
situations where their passwords or access codes are communicated to their 
colleagues who are not authorized such access. 
 
In relation to powers of law enforcement agencies, under section 10(1) of the 
Computer Crimes Act 1997, the powers of the law enforcement agency to search 
and seize evidence are subject to a warrant to be issued by the Magistrate. The 
Magistrate must have reasonable grounds for believing that the commission of an 
offence is committed.
154
 The Magistrate must have sufficient facts to form the basis 
of his belief. 
 
The powers given to the police under section 10(2) of the Computer Crimes Act 
1997 are very wide. The section provides: “(2) Whenever it appears to any police 
officer of or above the rank of Inspector that there is reasonable cause to believe that 
in any premises there is concealed or deposited any evidence of the commission of 
an offence under this Act, and the police officer has reasonable grounds for 
believing that by reason of the delay in obtaining a search warrant the object of the 
search is likely to be frustrated, he may exercise in and in respect of the premises all 
the powers mentioned in subsection (1) in as full and ample a measure as if he were 
empowered to do so by warrant issued under that subsection. 
 
Under the Act, any police officer may arrest without a warrant any person whom he 
reasonably believes to have committed or to be committing an offence against this 
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 See In re Kah Wai Video (Ipoh) Sdn. Bhd. [1987] 2 MLJ 459 at p.461 per J. Edgar Joseph Jr. 
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Act, and every offence against this Act shall be deemed to be seizable offence for 
the purposes of the law for the time being in force relating to criminal procedure.” 
Thus, under certain circumstances and conditions, the police may search without a 
search warrant and arrest without a warrant. 
 
Under section 11, a person guilty of the offence of obstructing a search shall on 
conviction be liable to a maximum fine of RM25,000.00 or to imprisonment of up 
to 3 years or to both. Section 12 of the Computer Crimes Act 1997 provides that all 
prosecutions under the Act can only be instituted by or with the written consent of 
the Public Prosecutor. 
 
4.4 Position in the US 
In the US, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act creates a number of offences, 
including the offence of unauthorized access to computers.
155
 It seeks to punish 
many of the activities commonly referred to as hacking.
156
 Under this law, it is 
illegal to have access without authorization to any computer system to obtain 
financial information held by any financial institution, credit information held by a 
consumer reporting agency, or credit card information held by the issuer of credit 
cards.
157
 
 
4.5 Position in India 
Cyber crimes in India have seen a sudden spurt. Cyber crimes have gone up by 60 
per cent in 2012 at 3,500 as against 2,070 in the previous year. The figures collected 
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 Edition, The MIT Press, London, 1996, p. 107. 
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by National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) give a graphic description of how 
cyber crimes have spread across the country. Maharashtra topped the list with 561 
(393 in 2011) crimes, followed by Andhra Pradesh with 454 (372) and Karnataka 
437 (160).
158
  
 
The data found that majority of the crimes are being done by criminals in the age 
group of 18 to 30.  “Financial offences dominate cyber crimes. Of late, we have 
noticed an increase where the fraudsters hacking into email accounts of companies 
and of customers. They read the entire email thread and lure the customers to 
deposit money in a fake account, duping both,” T.S. Uma Maheswara Rao, 
Inspector of Police (Cyber Crime Police Station, Hyderabad), told Business Line.  
 
The aggregate losses suffered by customers and companies in the last one year in 
Hyderabad were put at Rs 2 crore. The NCRB, which monitors and records crimes 
of all sorts across the country, has compiled a detailed cyber crime scene in the 
country, giving a break-up of cases under the IT Act and the Indian Penal Code. The 
list includes a variety of crimes – disgruntled employees breaking into systems, eve-
teasing, revenge, extortion and financial crimes.  
 
There was no statute in India for governing Cyber Laws involving privacy issues, 
jurisdiction issues, intellectual property rights issues and a number of other legal 
questions. With the tendency of misusing of technology, there arisen a need of strict 
statutory laws to regulate the criminal activities in the cyber world and to protect the 
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true sense of technology "Information Technology Act, 2000" [Ita- 2000] was 
enacted by Parliament of India to protect the field of e-commerce, e-governance, e-
banking as well as penalties and punishments in the field of cyber crimes. The 
above Act was further amended in the form of IT Amendment Act, 2008 [ITAA-
2008]. 
 
The ITA-2000 defines 'Computer' means any electronic magnetic, optical or other 
high-speed data processing device or system which performs logical, arithmetic, and 
memory functions by manipulations of electronic, magnetic or optical impulses, and 
includes all input, output, processing, storage, computer software, or 
communication facilities which are connected or related to the computer in a 
computer system or computer network. The word 'computer' and 'computer system' 
have been so widely defined and interpreted to mean any electronic device with data 
processing capability, performing computer functions like logical, arithmetic and 
memory functions with input, storage and output capabilities and therefore any 
high-end programmable gadgets like even a washing machine or switches and 
routers used in a network can all be brought under the definition. 
 
The scope and applicability of ITA-2000 was increased by its amendment in 2008. 
The word 'communication devices' inserted having an inclusive definition, taking 
into its coverage cell phones, personal digital assistance or such other devices used 
to transmit any text, video etc like what was later being marketed as iPad or other 
similar devices on Wi-fi and cellular models. Though ITA- 2000 defined 'digital 
signature', however said definition was incapable to cater needs of hour and 
therefore the term 'Electronic signature' was introduced and defined in the ITAA -
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2008 as a legally valid mode of executing signatures. This includes digital 
signatures as one of the modes of signatures and is far broader in ambit covering 
biometrics and other new forms of creating electronic signatures not confining the 
recognition to digital signature process alone. 
 
The new amendment has replaced Section 43 with Section 66. The Word "hacking" 
used in Section 66 of earlier Act has been removed and named as "data theft" in this 
section and has further been widened in the form of Sections 66A to 66F. The 
section covers the offences such as the sending of offensive messages through 
communication service, misleading the recipient of the origin of such messages, 
dishonestly receiving stolen computers or other communication device, stealing 
electronic signature or identity such as using another persons' password or electronic 
signature, cheating by percolation through computer resource or a communication 
device, publicly publishing the information about any person's location without 
prior permission or consent, cyber terrorism. 
 
 The acts of access to a computer resource without authorization, such acts which 
can lead to any injury to any person or result in damage or destruction of any 
property, while trying to contaminate the computer through any virus like Trojan 
etc. The offences covered under section 66 are cognizable and non-bailable. 
Whereas, the consequence of Section 43 of earlier Act were Civil in nature having 
its remedy in the form of damages and compensation only, but under Section 66 of 
the Amendment Act, if such act is done with criminal intention that is means area, 
then it will attract criminal liability having remedy in imprisonment or fine or both. 
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The Indian Penal Code was amended by inserting the word 'electronic' thereby 
treating the electronic records and documents on a par with physical records and 
documents. The Sections dealing with false entry in a record or false document etc 
(e.g. 192, 204, 463, 464, 464, 468 to 470, 471, 474, 476 etc) have since been 
amended as 'electronic record and electronic document' thereby bringing within the 
ambit of IPC.  
 
Now, electronic record and electronic documents has been treated just like physical 
records and documents during commission of acts of forgery or falsification of 
physical records in a crime. After the above amendment, the investigating.
159
 
agencies file the cases/ charge-sheet quoting the relevant sections from IPC under 
section 463,464, 468 and 469 read with the ITA/ITAA under Sections 43 and 66 in 
like offences to ensure the evidence and/or punishment can be covered and proved 
under either of these or under both legislation. 
 
4.6   Position in the European Union Convention on Cybercrimes  
This instrument is a product of Council of Europe whereby European Union 
Member States are signatory thereto. The Conviction behind establishing this 
instrument was to adhere to the dire need of pursuing of course as a matter of 
priority, a common criminal policy aiming at the protection of society against 
cybercrime, among many things, by having legislation and fostering International 
co-operation.
160
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http://www.mondaq.com/india/x/257328/Data+Protection+Privacy/An+Overview+Of+Cyber+La
ws+vs+Cyber+Crimes+In+Indian+Perspective 
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Article 2
161
, the Convention provides that it is an illegal to access to computer 
system.  Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed 
intentionally, the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without 
right. A Party may require that the offence be committed by infringing security 
measures, with the intent of obtaining computer data or other dishonest intent, or in 
relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer system.  
 
Article 3
162
 deals with illegal interception of communication system. 
“Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when 
committed intentionally, the interception without right, made by technical 
means, of non-public transmissions of computer data to, from or within a 
computer system, including electromagnetic emissions from a computer 
system carrying such computer data. A Party may require that the offence be 
committed with dishonest intent or in relation to a computer system that is 
connected to another computer system”. 
 
Article 4
163
 deals with data interference by deleting any information from the 
computer, damages or deteriorating the system without any right. This article 4 
provides as hereunder, 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when 
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committed intentionally, the damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration or 
suppression of computer data without right. 
 
Article 5 of the Convention deals with the System interference, Article 5 provides as 
follows and we quote it as hereunder: 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when 
committed intentionally, the serious hindering without right of the 
functioning of a computer system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, 
deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data. 
 
Article 7 of the Convention deals with Computer related forgery and run as follows: 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when 
committed intentionally and without right, the input, alteration, deletion, or 
suppression of computer data, resulting in inauthentic data with the intent 
that it be considered or acted upon for legal purposes as if it were authentic, 
regardless whether or not the data is directly readable and intelligible. A 
Party may require an intent to defraud, or similar dishonest intent, before 
criminal liability attaches.  
 
Article 8 of the Convention deals with computer-related fraud and provides as 
follows: 
Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when 
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committed intentionally and without right, the causing of a loss of property 
to another person by: 
 
a. Any input, alteration, deletion or suppression of computer data;  
b. Any interference with the functioning of a computer system, with 
fraudulent or dishonest intent of procuring, without right, an 
economic benefit for oneself or for another person.  
 
The Convention have identified other cybercrimes like child pornography, cyber 
terrorism, infringement of the copy rights example is the burning of CDs are some 
of cybercriminal conducts.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
We have seen in this chapter that legislation in a number of countries as shown 
above exist to combat cybercrimes. It was shown that Malaysia, the European 
Union and the UK have a good piece of legislation for cyber crimes, which 
Tanzania may adopt. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Conclusion 
The aim of this research was to examine how the existing penal laws are sufficient 
to combat cyber crimes in Tanzania. It undertook to review the role of law in 
combating electronic crimes in Tanzania to ensure that online consumers are legally 
protected.  The work has also assessed the efficacy of the legal framework in 
combating cybercrimes in Tanzania. The research has dissected cyber crimes in the 
country and figured out how it should be eliminated just by use of legal framework 
or other measures on top can be improvised to ensure that cyber crimes issues are 
addressed in broader context.  
 
It was observed that society as on today is happening more and more dependent 
upon technology and crime based on electronic offences are bound to increase. 
Endeavor of law making machinery of the nation should be in accordance with mile 
compared to the fraudsters, to keep the crimes lowest. Hence, it should be the 
persistent efforts of rulers and law makers to ensure that governing laws of 
technology contains every aspect and issues of cyber crime and further grow in 
continuous and healthy manner to keep constant vigil and check over the related 
crimes. 
 
As observed in this Study, information technology has spread throughout the world. 
Now days, computers are used in each and every sector wherein cyberspace 
provides equal opportunities to all for economic growth and human development. 
As the user of cyberspace grows increasingly diverse and the range of online 
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interaction expands, there is expansion in the cyber crimes and as pointed out 
earlier, the financial sector is the main target.  It is for this reason that there is need 
to adopt a strict law to regulate criminal activities relating to cyber and to provide 
better administration of justice to the victim of cyber crime. The United Kingdom 
has issued a law for cyber crimes since 1990. It was recently amended, in 
accordance with the European Convention on cyber crime, by The Police and 
Justice Act 2006. Chapter 48 which came into force on October 1, 2008. All aspects 
concerning cyber crimes were regulated.  
 
5.2 Recommendations 
Based on the conclusion above, the following recommendations may be advanced: 
1. The Penal Code should be amended to provide for criminal activities 
conducted using computers and computer networks. 
2. The offences that should be introduced in the Penal Code are hacking, illegal 
access to computers and computer networks, fraud committed using computers 
and computer networks, money laundering and related crimes, identity theft, 
sniphing and many others. 
3. It is not enough to amend the Penal Code, another law which is relevant to this 
study is the Criminal Procedure Act of 1985. It should as well be amended to 
provide for modern means of investigating cybercrimes. 
4. International cooperation is also vital in cybercrimes. It is recommended that 
there should be a convention at the international level similar to the one which 
is operational in the European Union. 
5. There should as well be training for judges, magistrates, investigators and 
prosecutors on cyber crimes. 
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